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CORPORATE CONTROL, DUAL CLASS, AND THE LIMITS
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Zohar Goshen* & Assaf Hamdani**
Companies with a dual-class structure have increasingly been
involved in high-proﬁle battles over the reallocation of control rights.
Google, for instance, sought to entrench its founders’ control by recapitalizing from a dual-class into a triple-class structure. The CBS board, in
contrast, attempted to dilute its controlling shareholder by distributing a
voting stock dividend that would empower minority shareholders to block
a merger it perceived to be harmful. These cases raise a fundamental
question at the heart of corporate law: What is the proper judicial
response to self-dealing claims regarding reallocations of corporate control
rights?
This Article shows that the reallocation of control rights raises an
inevitable tradeoff between investors’ protection from agency costs and the
controller’s ability to pursue its idiosyncratic vision, making the value of
different allocations of control rights both ﬁrm speciﬁc and individual
speciﬁc. It is thus inherently impossible to create objective valuation models for the reallocation of control rights. The impossibility of creating reliable valuation models sets the limits of judicial review: The legal tools
long used by Delaware courts to adjudicate conﬂicts over cash-ﬂow rights,
such as entire fairness review, are fundamentally incompatible with the
adjudication of conﬂicts over reallocations of control rights. This Article
explores the policy implications of this insight and suggests that courts
treat reallocations of control rights as questions of charter interpretation
as to who has the power to decide such reallocations and avoid reviewing
the discretion to use that power. Courts should enforce the decision of the
parties as to reallocations of control rights and apply the business judgment rule when the charter is silent.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Google’s board approved a proposal amending Google’s
charter to authorize the issuance of a new class of nonvoting Class C stock.1
Prior to this proposed recapitalization, Google’s capital structure was comprised of one-vote-per-share Class A shares, primarily held by public shareholders, and ten-votes-per-share Class B shares, primarily held by Google’s

1. Steven Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter
Control, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Apr. 13, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/
13/new-share-class-gives-google-founders-tighter-control (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
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founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin.2 Under this dual-class structure,3
Google had the ability to raise capital, incentivize employees, and acquire
other corporations by issuing Class A shares, while preserving control over
the company in the hands of Class B shareholders. However, this strategy
faced an upper limit—if enough Class A shares were issued, eventually the
voting power of Class B shares would be diluted to the point of the founders losing control.4
Google’s authorization of Class C shares was a strategic response to
this unwelcome hiccup: After the recapitalization, Google would be able
to issue as many Class C shares as it deemed necessary for business purposes, without ever threatening to dilute the founders’ control.5 This
move, therefore, reallocated control rights from the public shareholders to
the company founders, and enabled them to keep their control over the
company even as it continued to issue new shares. Of course, the recapitalization required board approval and a shareholder vote to amend the
company’s charter.6 But these procedures offered little meaningful protection because Page and Brin held a majority of voting rights. Thus, the charter amendment could be, and in fact was, approved with the two founders’
votes, and against the objection of Class A common shareholders—even
though Page and Brin were clearly self-interested.7

2. See Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 23–24 (Jan. 29, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312513028362/d452134d10k.
htm [https://perma.cc/5H4D-UMX4]; see also Paul Lee, Protecting Public Shareholders:
The Case of Google’s Recapitalization, 5 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 281, 283 (2015).
3. See Anita Anand, Complexities in Firms with Dual Class Shares, 3 Annals Corp.
Governance 184, 193 (2018) (deﬁning “dual-class shares” as a type of capital structure
involving “the issuance of two or more different classes of shares whereby one class (the
‘superior’ class) has more voting rights than shares held, while the other class (the ‘subordinate’ class) has fewer voting rights relative to the shares held”).
4. To understand the intuition, assume that at the start there were 100 Class A shares
and 100 Class B shares. Since Class B has 10 times the votes of Class A, the founders would
have 1,000 votes and the public would only have 100 votes (almost 91% of the voting rights
was in the hands of the founders). But if over time the number of Class A shares increased
and reached 1,000 shares, then both classes of shares would have 1,000 votes (only 50% of
the voting rights would accrue to the founders). From then on, any increase in the number
of Class A shares would leave the founders with fewer than 50% of the votes.
5. Google Settlement Means Stock-Split Can Proceed, CBS News (June 17, 2013),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-settlement-means-stock-split-can-proceed [https://
perma.cc/9YQ5-PGGP] (“By creating a new class of non-voting shares, Google will be able
to keep rewarding other employees with more stock and ﬁnancing potential acquisitions of
stock without undermining the voting power of Page and Brin.”).
6. See Geeyoung Min, Shareholder Voice in Corporate Charter Amendments, 43 J.
Corp. L. 289, 294 (2018) (“Under both the Model Business Corporation Act and the corporate law of all 50 states, including the Delaware General Corporation Law, amending a corporate charter requires both directors’ and shareholders’ approvals.”).
7. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Google’s Stock Settlement May Not Do Much for
Shareholders, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Sept. 11, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/09/11/googles-stock-settlement-may-not-do-much-for-shareholders (on ﬁle with the
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Class A shareholders swiftly responded to the recapitalization by
bringing a breach of ﬁduciary duty lawsuit in Delaware.8 The plaintiffs
argued that the recapitalization was a form of “self-dealing” that should be
reviewed under Delaware’s long-standing regime of entire fairness.9 The
Google defendants, however, claimed that the decision ought to receive
the deferential business judgment protection.10 Ultimately, the parties settled the dispute on the eve of the trial.11 The Google litigation thus left
unanswered the key doctrinal question as to whether entire fairness, business judgment, or some intermediate level of scrutiny is the appropriate
standard of review for “midstream” reallocations of control rights—that is,
changes to a company’s existing allocation of control rights.12
Subsequent to the Google settlement, several other dual-class ﬁrms
announced midstream recapitalizations from dual-class to triple-class
structures. First, Facebook and InterActiveCorp (IAC) proposed to create
a new class of nonvoting stock through a charter amendment.13 However,
after being targeted with suits by their respective shareholders, who argued
that these recapitalizations amounted to unfair self-dealing, both
Facebook and IAC withdrew their proposed recapitalization plans.14
Another company adopted a more cautious approach, and structured the
recapitalization ex ante in a way that complied with the entire fairness
review.15 Lastly, the board of CBS Corporation (CBS), also a dual-class company, recently proposed to unilaterally reallocate control rights from the
controlling shareholder to the public shareholders—rather than, as its

Columbia Law Review) (“Only about 12.7 percent of Google’s Class A stockholders . . . voted
in support of issuing the Class C stock. That’s a pretty poor showing by any measure.”).
8. See Plaintiffs’ Opening Pretrial Brief, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No.
7469-CS (Del. Ch. ﬁled June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 2728583.
9. Id. at 32 (“Self-dealing is present where, as here, special beneﬁts from a potential
transaction ﬂow to the controller.”).
10. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
11. See Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *29, In re Google Inc. Class C
S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“We settled
on the eve of trial, literally on the eve of trial.”).
12. See id. at *37 (describing the case as “interesting and novel” such that thenChancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. thought “it would be hazardous for anyone to predict how it
would have come out”).
13. See Facebook Inc., Schedule 14A Information: Proxy Statement Pursuant to
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 55–73 (May 2016) [hereinafter
Facebook, May 2016 Proxy Statement], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/
000132680116000053/facebook2016prelimproxysta.htm [https://perma.cc/48JQ-5SP3];
IAC/InterActiveCorp, Schedule 14A Information: Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 16 (Nov. 2016), http://ir.iac.com/staticﬁles/409d5e1a-a42c-4af9-a6ed-8dd9ad20feb4 [https://perma.cc/Y35V-ZHNQ].
14. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
15. See IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. 12742-CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *6–
9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (noting that “entire fairness review” would apply to the plaintiff’s
claim); see also infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.
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predecessors had done, from the public shareholders to the controller.16
In the face of what it viewed as a merger proposal that would harm the
company, the board announced its plan to dilute the controller by distributing voting shares as a stock dividend to all classes of shares (voting and
nonvoting), thereby empowering the minority shareholders to block the
merger.17 Yet again, the resulting suit ended in settlement.18
These cases raise a fundamental question of corporate law: What is
the appropriate standard of review for conﬂicts over the reallocation of
control rights at controlled companies?19 This question has not been
explored,20 and it is far from an obscure academic inquiry. Recapitalizations like Google’s are likely to recur as controlled companies that go public continue to employ multiclass share structures, thereby increasing the
likelihood of future recapitalizations and other midstream reallocation of
control rights.21 Yet, while a long line of Delaware case law has addressed
disputes over various forms of midstream reallocations of control rights,22
the Delaware courts have not yet adopted a clear approach concerning the
standard of review that applies to these reallocations of control rights.23
16. See CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385,
at *2 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018). The plan would have diluted the controller’s voting power
from approximately 80% to about 17%. Id.
17. Id.
18. See CBS Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exh. 10(a) (Sept. 9, 2018), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828/000119312518269601/d622048dex10a.htm
[https://perma.cc/5T4U-V4XF].
19. By “controlled company,” this Article refers to those companies whose shareholder
base is such that one shareholder owns a majority of the company’s voting stock.
20. In his article on hostile takeovers, Ron Gilson argues that courts lack competence
to determine whether it is “fair” to leave control with management or the bidder. See
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 824–27 (1981). Gilson, however, does not
address conﬂicts over the reallocation of control rights in controlled companies. Moreover,
he explains that the problem with fairness review of control contests is that courts lack the
competence to review what are essentially business decisions. See id. at 827 (arguing that
such a fairness inquiry “raises the same issue of judicial competence which justiﬁes a restrictive judicial role with respect to the duty of care”). By contrast, this Article posits that the
problem is the absence of acceptable methodologies for valuing control rights.
21. See Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Dual-Class: The Consequences of Depriving
Institutional Investors of Corporate Voting Rights, Harv. Law Sch. Forum on Corp.
Governance (May 17, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/17/dual-class-theconsequences-of-depriving-institutional-investors-of-corporate-voting-rights [https://perma.cc/
TKC2-HSAA] (noting a continuing trend of “issuing dual-class or multi-class stock”).
22. See infra section I.B.
23. Even if parties to recapitalization litigation continue to settle their disputes, the
correct standard of review remains central for bargaining at the settlement stage. In particular, uncertainty in the case law risks not only inaccurate assessments of the strength of cases
but also increased aversion to pursuing midstream recapitalizations at all. For instance,
Facebook not only paid a huge sum of money in attorney’s fees but also withdrew its recapitalization altogether. Jef Feeley & Sarah Frier, Facebook to Pay $67.5 Million in Fees in Suit
over Shares, Bloomberg: Technology (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-10-24/facebook-to-pay-67-5-million-in-fees-in-non-voting-shares-suit (on file with
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The doctrinal confusion, this Article argues, is driven by a fundamental shortcoming of corporate law. Delaware critically relies on ﬁduciary
duties and judicial review under the entire fairness standard to govern selfdealing and other conﬂicts of interest at both controlled and widely held
companies. This Article shows, however, that the legal framework that governs self-dealing24—the entire fairness analysis—cannot and should not be
applied to conﬂicts over the reallocation of control rights. Entire fairness
review requires courts to make an objective determination of the “fair
price” of the transaction at issue.25 Economists have developed valuation
models for many types of cash-ﬂow rights, like speciﬁc assets and entire
companies, that aid courts in determining fair price.26 Similar economic
models for valuing the reallocation of control rights simply do not exist.27
Moreover, this Article posits that developing an economic model that
objectively values the reallocation of corporate control rights is an inherently futile task because the value of control rights is ﬁrm speciﬁc and
individual speciﬁc. The allocation of control rights raises an inevitable
tradeoff between investors’ protection from agency costs and the controller’s ability to pursue its idiosyncratic vision,28 thus making the value of
different allocations of control rights both ﬁrm speciﬁc and individual
speciﬁc. Economic theory is capable of abstracting away from speciﬁc
attributes of an asset (such as a factory) in order to approximate the value
of that asset. Yet economic theory cannot abstract away from the speciﬁc
ﬁrm and the speciﬁc personality of a controller (such as Mark Zuckerberg
the Columbia Law Review). It is the latter distortion in the settlement process that poses the
greatest danger. See infra note 98.
24. See infra section I.A. CBS was an exceptional case that did not raise concerns for
self-dealing by a controlling shareholder but rather a conﬂicted action by the board. See
infra note 109 and accompanying text.
25. Under so-called “entire fairness” review, defendants face the burden of establishing
both (1) a fair price for the disputed transaction and (2) a fair process (“fair dealing”)
followed by the defendant board in considering and approving the disputed transaction.
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
26. See infra section I.A.1.
27. A look at the table of contents of the leading corporate ﬁnance textbooks reveals
that there is no chapter about valuation of control rights. See, e.g., Richard A. Brealey,
Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance (12th ed. 2017);
Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerﬁeld & Bradford D. Jordan, Fundamentals of
Corporate Finance (12th ed. 2018). Section II.B.2, infra, discusses the studies that attempt
to overcome the absence of a method to evaluate control rights and explains why these
methods do not even purport to value the effect of control by a speciﬁc individual over a
speciﬁc company.
28. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 Yale L.J. 560, 617 (2016) [hereinafter Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision]. That
article assumes that entrepreneurs value control because it allows them to pursue their
vision. For other explanations for why control of public corporations may be valuable to
controllers, see generally Ronald Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (2006)
(arguing that controlling shareholders are driven by nonpecuniary private beneﬁts, rather
than pecuniary beneﬁts of control).
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or Sergei Brin) without excluding from the valuation analysis the very
speciﬁc characteristics that make control valuable in that particular controller’s hands.29
Without a reliable valuation model, Delaware’s entire fairness framework breaks down: Not only will ex post judicial determinations of “fair
price” be impeded by the impossibility of reliably pricing corporate control rights, but also ex ante attempts to secure minority shareholder
approval will be thwarted by the lack of a reliable valuation backstop.30
Negotiating in the shadow of the law is impossible when the parties cannot
reliably estimate how a court will determine a fair price.
In light of the impossibility of valuing control rights—and consequent
courts’ inability to apply entire fairness review—how should courts regulate conﬂicts over reallocation of control rights? This Article argues that
Delaware should resolve control rights conﬂicts by determining, as a
matter of contractual interpretation, which party has the authority to reallocate control rights under the company’s charter.31 The parties—controllers and minority shareholders—are best left to agree ex ante on the voting
rule that will govern midstream reallocations of control rights. Therefore,
courts’ principal task should be to determine whether the controller can
reallocate control rights without receiving the approval of the minority
shareholders. Delaware courts should then defer to the arrangements on
which the parties had initially agreed and forgo any attempt to evaluate
the fairness of reallocation of control rights.32 As long as the charter grants
the controller the power to reallocate control rights, courts should apply
the business judgment rule to a controller’s choice to recapitalize. All
other methods will fail in the absence of objective valuations.
This approach not only avoids costly litigation and the valuation issues
implicated by control rights but also encourages clear drafting of the initial allocation of control rights in the corporate charter. And if the charter
is silent, courts should craft a default rule that balances the potential loss
of idiosyncratic vision (which results from giving the minority reallocation
authority) with the potential increase of agency costs (which results from
29. See infra section II.B; cf. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New
Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 811 (2017) (“If ﬁrms
were identical . . . then any reallocation of control rights between investors and managers
would increase one type of cost and decrease the other type by equal amounts . . . . [O]nly
when ﬁrms have different attributes [do] differences in governance structures matter, as
each ﬁrm aims at ﬁnding its optimal structure.”).
30. See infra section III.A.1.
31. See infra section III.B.
32. Applications of contract law principles are not uncommon in the corporate law
space. In particular, the rights of bondholders in Delaware have traditionally been resolved
as a matter of contract interpretation. See, e.g., Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More
Fun?: A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 Colum. Bus.
L. Rev. 1, 8 (“In determining what rights and protections holders of publicly issued bonds
of solvent corporations have against adverse corporate action, courts have traditionally
looked to contract law.”).
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giving the controller reallocation authority).33 More speciﬁcally,
Delaware’s longstanding pre-Google precedents, studies of market performance, and changing market realities in public companies’ shareholder
power all weigh in favor of preserving the traditional default rule that protects against the loss of idiosyncratic vision by granting controllers business
judgment rule protection in decisions of midstream reallocations of
control.34
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the
Delaware case law on resolving cash-ﬂow and control rights disputes in
controlled companies. While Delaware has developed a clear, sophisticated governing regime to adjudicate cash-ﬂow rights, in the case of
control rights conﬂicts, Delaware has struggled and ultimately been inconsistent in its approach. Part II explains this inconsistency by demonstrating
the inevitable tradeoff that underlies the allocation of control rights.
Moreover, Part II explains why developing a reliable methodology for valuing reallocations of control rights is a futile task that will make the application of Delaware’s existing corporate law regime impossible. In light of
the foregoing insights, Part III considers how courts should approach conﬂicts over control rights in controlled companies and ultimately proposes
that courts resolve these conﬂicts through interpretation of the company
charter.
I.

CASH-FLOW RIGHTS, CONTROL RIGHTS, AND CORPORATE LAW

An important goal of corporate law is to protect public investors in
controlled companies from opportunistic self-dealing by a controlling
shareholder.35 Delaware relies on its expert courts to restrict self-dealing,
and these courts have developed a sophisticated doctrinal framework for
that purpose.36 This Part describes the application of this framework to two
types of disputes between controllers and minority shareholders: (1) disputes concerning the allocation of cash-ﬂow rights; and (2) disputes
concerning the allocation of control rights, including midstream recapitalizations. While courts and commentators have emphasized the need to

33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra section III.B.2.
35. See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. Fin. Econ. 430, 430–31 (2008)
(describing the increasing emphasis of academics on corporate self-dealing over the last
twenty years); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Beneﬁts of Control:
Ex Ante Control Mechanisms Versus Ex Post Transaction Review, 169 J. Institutional &
Theoretical Econ. 160, 180–81 (2013) (arguing that ex post judicial review of transactions
with controlling shareholders or their affiliates is superior to ex ante limits on dual-class and
other leveraged control structures).
36. For a critique of the proposed European regime on self-dealing transactions, see
Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Challenges (with
a Critique of the European Commission Proposal), 16 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 1, 25–31 (2015).
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constrain self-dealing, they have not examined the distinction between
conﬂicts over cash-ﬂow rights and control rights and its implications.
Section I.A explains that Delaware courts have generally applied the
entire fairness standard of review to conﬂicts over cash-ﬂow rights. Section
I.B shows that Delaware courts, when addressing conﬂicts over control
rights, have not followed a uniform approach, thereby creating uncertainty over the law governing those conﬂicts. The overview in this Part not
only illuminates some of the more puzzling pieces of Delaware’s corporate
law doctrine but also frames the argument that the legal tools governing
the reallocation of cash-ﬂow rights should not apply to reallocations of
control rights.
A.

Cash-Flow Rights

Cash-ﬂow rights determine who will receive a corporation’s economic
value, such as its proﬁts and capital gains, as well as how much value they
will receive and when they will receive it.37 Disputes over the allocation of
cash-ﬂow rights in controlled companies arise when the controlling and
minority shareholders disagree as to the proper allocation of value precipitated by the business. Generally speaking, cash-ﬂow rights conﬂicts involve
either a transaction in which the controller stands on one side and the controlled corporation on the other or an action taken by the corporation that
results in reallocation of discernable economic value from the minority to
the controller (both cases are commonly referred to as self-dealing).38 For
instance, minority shareholders and a controller might dispute whether
the price offered to minority shareholders by the controller in a so-called
“freezeout” merger was fair;39 or they might dispute whether an asset sold
to, or acquired from, the corporation by the controlling owner was priced
fairly.40

37. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 578, 584 (describing how sole-owner entrepreneurs retain cash-ﬂow rights in the form of rights to all income
from the business).
38. See id. at 571, 605–10 (describing self-dealing transactions and other behavior that
can result in disproportionate reallocation of value to the controller).
39. See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 Yale L.J. 2, 5 n.1 (2005) (“A
freezeout is a transaction in which a controlling shareholder buys out the minority shareholders in a publicly traded corporation . . . .”).
40. See, e.g., Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1218 (Del. 2012) (discussing a challenge by minority shareholders to the company’s acquisition of its controller’s
99.15% interest in another company on the grounds that the acquisition was at an inﬂated
price); In re Straight Path Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Stockholder Litig., No. CV 2017-0486-SG,
2018 WL 3120804, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 25, 2018) (discussing, in relevant part, an allegation
by minority shareholders that the controlling shareholder had breached his ﬁduciary duties
by selling some of the company’s intellectual property assets for six million dollars to settle
an indemniﬁcation claim, when an existing consent decree had valued the assets at ﬁfty
million dollars).
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In Delaware, the regime that governs self-dealing is the entire fairness
standard.41 In practice, however, controlling shareholders engaging in selfdealing have a choice: They can either submit the transaction to a judicial
evaluation of its fairness or forgo such judicial review by voluntarily
agreeing to a set of procedural conditions. Depending on the controller’s
decision, Delaware courts will apply one of two alternative frameworks to
cases of self-dealing involving cash ﬂows:42 (1) entire fairness review, or (2)
review under the business judgment rule when the self-dealing transaction
was conditioned on receiving the approval of both the majority of the
minority shareholders and a special independent committee (together
known as the MFW conditions).43 Section I.A.1 discusses the ﬁrst of these
frameworks, while section I.A.2 discusses the second.
1. Entire Fairness Review. — The Delaware courts normally apply the
entire fairness standard to cases of self-dealing. Traditionally, under the
entire fairness standard, a controlling shareholder bears the burden of
proving the transaction’s fairness.44 Reviewing a transaction under “entire
fairness” expressly requires scrutiny, not only of the process by which a
transaction took place (“fair dealing”) but also of the price of the transaction itself (“fair price”).45 Effectively, this means that in controlled
companies, the controller is free to force a self-dealing transaction on the
minority,46 so long as this transaction is subsequently subjected to an
objective valuation of its fairness.47

41. See infra section I.A.1.
42. A third alternative in which the entire fairness review applies but with a shift in the
burden of proof is also possible. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117
(Del. 1994) (“[A]n approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors
or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of
fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholderplaintiff.”). This Article does not discuss this alternative because it does not add any insight
to the analysis.
43. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (introducing the
MFW conditions).
44. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703, 711 (Del. 1983) (describing how
transactions involving potential self-dealing concerns invoke the entire fairness standard).
45. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he concept of fairness has two aspects, fair dealing and fair price, both of which must be examined
together in resolving the ultimate question of entire fairness.”).
46. For expositional convenience, this Article disregards the potential role of the
board when its approval is required for self-dealing transactions. The extent to which
boards—even without the judicial review—can be relied upon to resist powerful controllers
is beyond the scope of this Article. For analysis of the challenges facing the oversight role of
independent directors and potential reforms, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf
Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1271
(2017).
47. See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory
Meets Reality, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 393, 426 (2003) (“If challenged in court, the interested shareholder must demonstrate both fair dealing and a fair price to satisfy the ‘entire fairness’
test.”).
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Entire fairness review is fundamentally reliant upon the ability and
competence of a third party—in this case, the Delaware courts—to perform an objective valuation of the disputed transaction. Given the need to
determine fair price, Delaware courts faced with cash-ﬂow disputes are
routinely tasked with establishing the objective value of entire companies,
business divisions, speciﬁc assets, and so on, in order to determine the
appropriate payment owed to the dissenting minority shareholders.48 To
do so, courts rely on valuation models, developed by economists for the
pricing of assets,49 such as the Discounted Cash-Flow (“DCF”) model.50
Applying valuation models is challenging for most courts, as it requires at
least some understanding of ﬁnancial theory. Despite nontrivial challenges
to performing an objective valuation of the multifaceted assets and
companies involved in conﬂicted transactions, Delaware courts, with their
unique mastery of ﬁnancial valuation techniques developed by economists, have been quite successful at applying the entire fairness review to
cash-ﬂow disputes in controlled companies.51
To be sure, Delaware courts might disagree with the valuation methods offered by parties to the litigation or with the inputs that should be
used in a speciﬁc case.52 Delaware courts also have occasionally rejected
the valuation conclusions of parties to a litigation and instead conducted
an independent valuation.53 Yet, despite these disagreements, courts do

48. See R. Scott Widen, Delaware Law, Financial Theory and Investment Banking
Valuation Practice, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 579, 579 (2008) (“Delaware courts have developed a
surprisingly large body of law regarding the proper analytics for valuing businesses. Most of
this law has been developed in the context of adjudicating appraisal rights of dissenting
shareholders in corporate M&A or going-private transactions.”).
49. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712–13.
50. Timothy A. Luehrman, What’s It Worth?: A General Manager’s Guide to Valuation,
Harv. Bus. Rev. (May–June 1997), https://hbr.org/1997/05/whats-it-worth-a-general-managersguide-to-valuation [https://perma.cc/7Q3N-97BH] (recounting the development of the DCF
model “as best practice for valuing corporate assets” and discussing the different ways companies use the model).
51. See, e.g., William A. Groll & David Leinwand, Judge and Banker—Valuation
Analyses in the Delaware Courts, 116 Pa. St. L. Rev. 957, 959 (2012) (“[T]he Delaware courts
have become quite sophisticated in reviewing valuation analyses and are thoroughly conversant in the related, highly technical ﬁnancial arcana.”); Widen, supra note 48, at 581
(“Delaware courts have become increasingly sophisticated in their understanding of business valuation techniques.”).
52. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. CV 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123,
at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016), rev’d sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirﬁeld Value Partners,
L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (“I conclude that the most reliable determinant of fair value
of DFC’s shares is a blend of three imperfect techniques: a discounted cash ﬂow model
incorporating certain methodologies and assumptions each expert made and some of my
own, the comparable company analysis respondent’s expert performed, and the transaction
price.”).
53. See In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig., C.A. No. 8388-VCG, 2016 WL
4275388, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 2016) (rejecting the valuations of the testifying experts
and opting instead to adjust the inputs to the DCF model per the court’s judgment).
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not devise their own methodologies for valuing cash-ﬂow rights.54 As the
next Parts argue, the fact that no ﬁnancial technique can credibly value
control rights undermines courts’ competence to adjudicate conﬂicts over
the reallocation of these rights.
2. Voluntary MFW Conditions. — Under Delaware law, controlling
shareholders that wish to avoid costly litigation and the uncertainty associated with judicial “fairness” review can voluntarily condition the execution
of a conﬂicted transaction upon receiving the support of both the majority
of the minority and a negotiating “special committee” of independent and
disinterested directors.55 When these conditions are met, Delaware courts
do not apply entire fairness review. Instead, they will apply the highly deferential business judgment rule and avoid scrutiny of the transaction.56 In
these cases, therefore, Delaware courts focus more on whether the minority shareholders were fully informed and uncoerced when voting upon the
transaction than on the valuation methodologies that were used to establish the fairness of the price.57 Thus, the efficiency of the voluntary MFW
conditions in cash-ﬂow disputes is largely a product of the ability of minority shareholders and the “special committee” to competently value a transaction and avoid bargaining failure in cases where a transaction would
create value.

54. For a discussion of the Delaware courts choosing between various valuation methodologies developed by economists, see, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of
Modern Finance Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 38 (2003); Samuel C.
Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 21 J. Corp. L. 457, 463 (1996).
55. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Del. 2014) (describing
the requirements to clear a conﬂicted transaction without being held to the entire fairness
standard).
56. See id. at 644 (“[B]usiness judgment is the standard of review that should govern
[freezeouts] . . . where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the approval of an
independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulﬁlls its duty of care; and
the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.”). Delaware courts
have made clear that the deferential standard of review is only available in cases where the
transaction is conditioned on the relevant approvals ab initio. See, e.g., In re Synutra Int’l,
Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 2017-0032-JTL, 2018 WL 705702, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2018)
(“The ﬁrst prong of the [MFW] framework requires that ‘the merger is conditioned ab initio
upon both the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee . . .
and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.’” (quoting
M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644)).
57. See Itai Fiegenbaum, The Geography of MFW-Land, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 763, 796–
97 (2017) (describing MFW’s “dual approval mechanism” as one “grounded in the efficacy
of the positive endorsement by two qualiﬁed decisionmakers” and “believed to produce
comparable beneﬁts to intrusive judicial review in guaranteeing the best price possible for
minority stockholders”).
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Control Rights

Unlike in the context of cash-ﬂow rights, Delaware courts have been
inconsistent in their resolution of conﬂicts over control rights.58 Control
rights are, broadly stated, rights to decide on the business direction of a
company, ranging from day-to-day operational to strategic management
decisions.59 In controlled companies, control rights provide the controlling shareholder with the right to decide the company’s direction. Conﬂicts over control rights, like conﬂicts over cash-ﬂow rights, arise either
when a controller participates in a transaction where they stand on one
side of the transaction and the controlled company stands on the other or
when an action is taken by the corporation and it has the effect of reallocating control rights either from the minority to the controller or vice
versa. Importantly, this Article does not consider conﬂicts that arise at the
initial allocation of control rights when the company goes public or when
investors decide to provide capital but rather focuses on conﬂicts that arise
from changes to an existing allocation of control rights—midstream
changes.60
Section I.B.1 discusses the earlier cases in which Delaware courts have
applied the deferential business judgment rule, while section I.B.2 discusses the more recent cases in which Delaware courts have moved in the
direction of applying the very demanding entire fairness review. Given the
two diverging sets of case law, Delaware’s existing framework for determining whether reallocations of control rights deserve the scrutiny reserved
for self-dealing is incoherent.
1. Business Judgment Rule. — In applying the business judgment rule
to midstream governance changes, Delaware courts must ﬁnd that the
challenged action taken by the corporation did not amount to “self-dealing,” regardless of the disparate effect it might have on the controlling
owner and the minority shareholders.61 To ﬁnd this, the reviewing court
must conclude that the controller did not receive something “to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority.”62 Perhaps because of the appearance of an equal pro rata legal effect in control rights conﬂicts, some courts
have applied the business judgment rule even when charter amendments
clearly resulted in the reallocation of control rights to the controlling
58. Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 564.
59. Id. at 565.
60. See generally Yu-Hsin Lin, Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders:
Corporate Governance and Leveraged Corporate Control, 2017 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 453,
458, 486–87 (deﬁning the “midstream” stage as the “post-IPO” stage and describing the
Google and Facebook recapitalizations as “midstream changes”).
61. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that intrinsic fairness applies only when a controlling shareholder engages in self-dealing). Self-dealing is when a parent company uses its dominion over a subsidiary to cause the subsidiary “to
act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of,
and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary.” Id.
62. Id.
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shareholder.63 Indeed, at times, Delaware courts have recognized that
while the disparate economic effects of a corporate decision pose a practical conﬂict, such a conﬂict is legally irrelevant, and have thus applied the
business judgment rule in their review. The discussion below summarizes,
in chronological order, Delaware’s treatment of three of these midstream
changes—namely, dual-class recapitalizations, tenure voting recapitalizations, and amendments relating to board representation.
a. Dual-Class Recapitalization. — In a dual-class recapitalization, a public company that has one class of shares switches to a dual-class structure.64
The controlling shareholder is typically left holding the class of shares with
superior voting rights and the public shareholders are left holding those
shares with inferior voting rights.65 The dual-class recapitalization results
in reallocation of control rights from minority shareholders to the controlling shareholder, because it allows the controllers to maintain control
without holding the majority of the company’s cash-ﬂow rights.66
Delaware courts, however, did not review these evidently conﬂicted
recapitalizations under the entire fairness standard. For instance, in Societé
Holding Ray D’Albion S.A. v. Saunders Leasing System, Inc., a minority shareholder of Saunders Leasing System, Inc., challenged a recapitalization
plan that proposed to convert all existing stock into a class of stock with
one vote per share (high-voting shares) and then issue a stock dividend to
all holders of that class in the form of a share with one tenth of a vote per
share (low-voting shares).67 Arguing that the plan was designed to achieve
“the perpetuation of control” by the controller’s family—who would be
able to retain majority voting power without the corresponding cash-ﬂow
rights holdings by selling the newly distributed low-voting shares—the
plaintiff asked the court for a restraining order to prevent the plan.68
Though the court acknowledged that the controllers had ﬁduciary duties
63. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 606 n.141 (discussing the difficulties of identifying self-dealing in control rights conﬂicts).
64. See Anand, supra note 3, at 193–95.
65. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem
of Shareholder Choice, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1988).
66. Richard S. Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 153, 153
(1988).
67. No. 6648, 1981 WL 15094, at *1–3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1981). For a similar case, see
Weiss v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., No. 8811, 1989 WL 80345, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1989). In
Weiss, a class of Rockwell’s shareholders challenged a charter amendment that created a new
class of ten-votes-per-share stock, which would be distributed pro rata as a dividend to existing shareholders. The court acknowledged that the amendment’s effect was to “cause disproportionate voting power to become concentrated signiﬁcantly in the hands of Rockwell’s
long term stockholders.” Id. Moreover, because of an employee savings plan that included
thirty percent of Rockwell’s outstanding stock, the directors were alleged to form part of
those long-term shareholders who would beneﬁt from the amendment. Id. Though the
court acknowledged that one possible outcome of such a plan was to entrench the position
of the controllers, it found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the amendment was
not “a valid corporate act.” Id. at *3.
68. Saunders Leasing Sys., 1981 WL 15094, at *1.
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to the minority shareholders, it ultimately found that the plan was “fair to
minority stockholders,” in the colloquial sense of the term, and denied the
plaintiff’s request.69 Such a fast, deferential ruling suggests that the court
did not ﬁnd the case to be one involving self-dealing.
b. Tenure Voting Recapitalization. — Tenure voting is a regime in which
shares held for a certain period of time are granted superior voting rights
over those that have been held for a shorter length of time.70 In a tenure
voting recapitalization, a company amends its charter midstream to provide for voting rights that change based on the length of time for which
the share is held.71 Since public shareholders frequently trade their
shares,72 and the controlling shareholder holds the control block for a
long period of time,73 a tenure voting recapitalization, much like a dualclass recapitalization, practically results in the controlling shareholder
holding shares with higher voting power than the minority shareholders.
In other words, a tenure voting recapitalization reallocates control rights
to controlling shareholders by increasing the relative voting power of controlling shareholders.
In Williams v. Geier, minority shareholders challenged a controlled
company’s tenure voting charter amendment after it had been recommended by the board and approved by the controlling shareholders.74 The
amendment granted all existing shares ten votes, but provided that once a
share was sold, its voting rights would drop to one vote; the share would
regain its ten votes only if held for a period of three years. Given the trading differences between public shareholders and controlling shareholders
discussed above, by merely holding onto some of their existing shares, the

69. Id. at *3. To be clear, it must be emphasized that the determination that the plan
was “fair” was not part of an entire fairness valuation, but rather a legal determination of
the contractual effects of the plan.
70. See David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting
and the U.S. Public Company, 72 Bus. Law., Spring 2017, at 295, 297 (“Tenure voting rewards long-term investors with additional votes per share.”); Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M.
Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 541, 547 (2015)
(describing “time-phased voting” arrangements as arrangements that “accord long-term
shareholders more votes per share than they accord short-term shareholders”).
71. Berger et al., supra note 70, at 305 (“A company that recapitalizes its shares under
a tenure-voting plan would give long-term shareholders more votes per share than shortterm shareholders.”).
72. Id. at 298. The average holding period of public-company stocks began to decline
in the early 1980s, with the rise of the takeover boom. Id. (“By 1990, the period had fallen
to about two years, and by the mid-2000s it was less than a year. By some accounts, the average holding period in 2015 for individual stocks across all U.S. markets was about seventeen
weeks.”).
73. Dallas & Barry, supra note 70, at 548 (noting that “[b]ecause controlling shareholders are generally long-term shareholders,” tenure voting “enhances their voting power
relative to their percentage of share ownership . . . [and] allows the controlling shareholders to reduce their ownership in their ﬁrms while maintaining control”).
74. 671 A.2d 1368, 1370–71 (Del. 1996).
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controllers could preserve control over the corporation without necessarily holding a majority of the company’s cash-ﬂow rights.75 Pointing to
this consequence, the plaintiffs argued that the amendment be reviewed
under the entire fairness standard.
However, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule applies to tenure voting recapitalizations. The majority opinion
recognized the unique beneﬁt that the amendment conferred on the controllers—allowing them to sell some of their holdings without relinquishing control—but concluded that the disparate economic impact of the
changes did not amount to self-dealing.76 By contrast, the dissenting
judges urged that the charter amendment should be subject to full judicial
scrutiny under the entire fairness standard because it conferred “substantial beneﬁts on the majority shareholders.”77 The dissent noted that “the
charter amendments worked fundamental changes in the governance” of
the company by giving “the Geier Family shareholders control not only
over the future composition of the Board, but over the strategic long-term
planning of the company.”78
c. Board Representation. — Charter amendments that affect the frequency with which board members are up for election have also been
reviewed under the business judgment rule, as in eBay Domestic Holdings,
Inc. v. Newmark.79 Craigslist’s charter provided for a cumulative voting
regime80 that was designed to give eBay, a minority shareholder, the ability
to appoint one out of the three members of the board.81 The majority
75. See id. at 1378.
76. See id. (“[T]here was on this record . . . no non-pro-rata or disproportionate beneﬁt which accrued to the Family Group on the face of the Recapitalization, although the
dynamics of how the Plan would work in practice had the effect of strengthening the Family
Group’s control . . . .”); see also id. at 1382 (noting that in the case “entire fairness is not an
issue”).
77. Id. at 1386 (Hartnett, J. & Horsey, J., dissenting).
78. See id. (“The proposed Plan signiﬁcantly alters shareholder voting rights to the
detriment of those minority shareholders who have no interest in preserving the family ownership, or whose investment objectives may have a different time frame from the Family
Group.”).
79. See 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
80. For a discussion of cumulative voting, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as
Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124, 127 n.8
(1994) (describing the typical cumulative voting regime in corporate settings). Classiﬁed
boards work against cumulative voting by requiring increased voting power to elect a director. Consider, for instance, a board of nine individuals elected using a cumulative voting
regime and a minority shareholder M who owns forty shares, corresponding to forty percent
of the voting power. If the nine board members are elected annually, then M only needs to
allocate eleven percent of her voting power to elect a director. Edmund A. Stephan,
Cumulative Voting and Classiﬁed Boards: Some Reﬂections on Wolfson v. Avery, 31 Notre
Dame Law. 351, 354 n.5 (1956) (offering an example of this formula). However, if the board
is classiﬁed, with only three directors up for election every year, then M will need to use
twenty-six percent of her voting power to elect a director. Id.
81. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 13 (explaining that though eBay did not
have a “contractual right” to ﬁll the third board seat, “the laws of mathematics under a
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shareholders, however, amended the charter to provide for a classiﬁed
board, which created three classes of directors, with only one director facing an election each year.82 The classiﬁed board amendment rendered the
cumulative voting regime impractical, in that it eliminated the possibility
for eBay “to cumulate votes and direct those votes towards a single director
candidate,” and thereby allowed the controllers to ensure that only their
candidates would be elected to the board.83 eBay contended that entire
fairness should apply because the classiﬁed board amendment beneﬁted
the controlling shareholders to the detriment of eBay.84 While the court in
eBay recognized the conﬂict underlying the charter amendment,85 it
refused to review the amendment under the entire fairness standard.
Instead, the court held that the amendment’s disparate impact did not
amount to self-dealing, and that eBay was not deprived of any right
awarded to it under Delaware law.86
2. Entire Fairness Review. — The decisions discussed above applied the
business judgment rule to midstream reallocations of control rights. More
recent Delaware decisions, however, seem to have implied that entire fairness is the standard of review for midstream recapitalizations. The discussion below provides a chronological overview of recent cases.
a. Google. — As explained above,87 the plaintiffs in the Google litigation argued that Google’s move from a dual-class to a triple-class structure
reallocated control rights from Class A to Class B shares.88 Thus, they
alleged that the recapitalization constituted a form of self-dealing, subject
to Delaware’s exacting entire fairness scrutiny.89 The defendants claimed
cumulative voting system with a non-staggered board” ensured it would be able to elect one
of the three directors).
82. Id. at 22.
83. Id. at 23.
84. See id. at 37.
85. See id. at 23 (“Practically speaking, however, the cumulative voting provisions are
not meaningful if only one director position is up for election in any given year.”).
86. Id. at 38. The chancery court offered several reasons. First, it noted that “[the controllers] did not realize a ﬁnancial beneﬁt by approving the Staggered Board Amendments
so there was no self-dealing on the basis of ﬁnancial considerations.” Id. Second, it explained
that eBay was importantly not “deprived” of an entitlement because it was not “entitled” to
Craigslist’s cumulative voting regime. Id. (“If a corporation implements a staggered board,
and this renders the corporation’s cumulative voting system ineffective, minority stockholders have not been deprived of anything they are entitled to under the common law or the
DGCL, because . . . [they] are not entitled to a cumulative voting system in the ﬁrst
instance.”). Lastly, the court admitted that the amendment had “disparate” impact on eBay,
but concluded that it was “not the sort of disparate treatment, however, that can be classiﬁed
as self-dealing because the law expressly allows majority stockholders to elect the entire
board.” Id.
87. See supra notes 2–12 and accompanying text.
88. See Plaintiffs’ Opening Pretrial Brief at 1, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig.,
No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. ﬁled June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 2728583.
89. Id. at 32 (“‘[D]efendants with a conﬂicting self-interest must demonstrate that the
deal was entirely fair to other stockholders.’ The proposed Recapitalization unquestionably
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the recapitalization was aimed at long-term value-maximization rather
than entrenchment and, critically, that it was approved by independent
and disinterested directors, entitling the decision to Delaware’s business
judgment rule review.90
Though the case ended in settlement, the corporate community was
not left wholly in the dark regarding the court’s intuition. During the
settlement hearing, then-Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr.91 suggested that the
proposed recapitalization may have run afoul of expectations on the part of
Class A shareholders that they might eventually, given enough time and
dilution of Class B voting power, obtain a majority stake in Google.92
Moreover, he referenced “tensions” in Delaware law as to the treatment of
a conﬂicted vote by controlling shareholders, suggesting that Williams v.
Geier might not squarely dictate business judgment review in the case of
midstream recapitalizations.93 Still, Strine cautioned that “it would be
hazardous for anyone to predict how [the trial] would have come out.”94
Indeed, the notion that a recapitalization like the one proposed by Google
might be subject to entire fairness was surprising, as such expectations of
minority shareholders were never legally recognized. Moreover, the
reallocation effect on minority shareholders of switching from dual-class
to triple-class shares is less pronounced than the effect of switching from a
one-share-one-vote to a dual-class structure or to a tenure voting regime,
the latter of which received the business judgment rule protection.95 In
provides personal beneﬁts to Page and Brin, triggering the entire fairness review.”
(footnotes omitted) (quoting In re S. Peru Copper Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., 30
A.3d 60, 87 (Del. Ch. 2011))).
90. See Opening Pre-Trial Brief for Google Inc. and Independent Director Defendants
at 25–31, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. ﬁled June 10,
2013), 2013 WL 2728591 (“[T]he Recapitalization was approved by Google’s disinterested
and independent Board for the purpose of providing the Company with the ﬂexibility it
needs to do stock-based acquisitions and issue stock-based compensation, while at the same
time maintaining Google’s incredibly successful governance structure.”).
91. Strine was, until 2019, the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.
92. See Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *27, In re Google Inc. Class C
S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“[R]ight
now I have a certain percentage contractual expectancy if Google pays out dividends, and
then I have a certain kind of noncontractual market-based assumption about how people
look at the equity of the company . . . . You’ve now taken my same interest and just divided
it in half.”). Strine also noted that “it’s never been the case that interested voting power gets
a pass simply because it has voting power.” Id. at *38.
93. Id.
94. Id. (“[T]he stronger argument on behalf of the defendants is that they . . . believed
that this was the right thing for Google’s public stockholders and that from the beginning,
everyone has been clear . . . that these founders were going public but with no . . . intention
to relinquish voting control . . . .”).
95. Perhaps with this in mind, some have agreed with Strine’s assessment that it was far
from guaranteed that entire fairness would have been the correct standard to apply to the
Google recapitalization. See Settlement Deletes Trial over Google Stock Split, Westlaw J. Del.
Corp., June 24, 2013, at *1 (noting that Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh observed that
the Google “plaintiffs’ characterization of the stock split was puzzling,” and stating, “If you
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short, the Google case became the ﬁrst in a series of recent cases that have
cast doubt on the standard of review that applies to midstream
recapitalizations.
b. Facebook and IAC. — Following Google’s settlement, Facebook and
IAC each proposed amending their respective charters to authorize the
issuance of a new class of nonvoting stock, citing as their motivation the
ﬂexibility to raise and deploy signiﬁcant capital without diluting the ownership stakes of the founders—Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook and Barry
Diller of IAC.96 Stockholders of both Facebook and IAC sued to challenge
the respective recapitalizations.97 Unlike Google, however, these lawsuits
did not end in a settlement. Rather, both Facebook and IAC withdrew their
recapitalization plans and avoided facing the costs and uncertainty of
litigation.98
c. Crane. — In IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, NRG Energy, Inc.
(NRG) proposed a dual-class to triple-class recapitalization of NRG Yield,
Inc. (Yield), a portfolio company in which NRG held a controlling stake.99
However, unlike the Google, Facebook, or IAC cases, NRG conditioned
the recapitalization from the outset on the approval of both (1) a majority
of Yield shares not affiliated with NRG, and (2) a fully empowered, independent special committee.100 In so doing, NRG attempted to shepherd
have corporate control, there shouldn’t be anything suspect about approving an action that
keeps control exactly where it’s been since the company’s inception”).
96. See supra note 13.
97. See Josh Beckerman, Calpers Sues Barry Diller over IAC/InterActive Stock Plan,
Wall St. J. (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-sues-barry-diller-over-iacinteractive-stock-plan-1481585007 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Dan Levine,
Facebook Hit with Lawsuit over Plan to Issue New Stock, Reuters (Apr. 29, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-stocks-lawsuit-idUSKCN0XQ2LM
[https://perma.cc/Z9CU-LREF].
98. See Facebook, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680117000042/form8k_92217.htm [https://perma.cc/
BS4Z-9HTA]. The court, in approving a subsequent settlement, allowed the plaintiff to
recover sixty-eight million dollars due to the success of blocking Facebook’s recapitalization.
See In re Facebook, Inc. Class C Reclassiﬁcation Litig., No. 12286-VCL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS
1117, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2018). Similarly, IAC’s Board of Directors “determined not
to pursue the Company’s previously announced plan to create a new class of non-voting
stock.” IAC/InterActiveCorp, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (June 21, 2017), https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/891103/000110465917041328/a17-15693_18k.htm [https://
perma.cc/BZM3-226Y]. In announcing its intent to abandon its recapitalization plans, IAC
speciﬁcally noted the pending litigation as a motivating factor: In light of “recent
developments in the stockholder litigation that made it unlikely that the litigation would be
ﬁnally resolved until late 2018 or 2019, . . . the considerable legal and related expenses of
the litigation, and other relevant information, the Board determined not to proceed with
the Class C Recapitalization.” Id.
99. No. 12742-CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017). In fact, Yield
established two new classes of common stock, Classes C and D. Both granted one hundredth
of a vote and would be distributed to Class A and B shareholders through a stock split. Id.
at *1, *4.
100. See id. at *4.
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the transaction through the voluntary MFW conditions in order to lower
the standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment.101 Crane
is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the transaction structure revealed that
NRG considered the risk of entire fairness review sufficiently likely to warrant the time and expense of implementing the voluntary MFW conditions. Second, and just as important, the chancery court did in fact choose
to apply entire fairness review as a threshold matter, but then reduced the
level of scrutiny to business judgment deference per MFW.102 As the court
explained, entire fairness applied because the recapitalization afforded
NRG “something uniquely valuable to the controller,” namely, “a
means . . . to ensure it would be able to retain voting control of Yield well
into the future without abandoning a key aspect of its original business
model.”103 In other words, the court found that in a reallocation of control
rights, notwithstanding the pro rata legal effect, the controller receives
something “to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority.”104
d. CBS. — On May 17, 2018, CBS, a dual-class corporation controlled
by National Amusements, Inc. (NAI),105 decided to distribute a pro rata
voting-shares stock dividend to all of its shareholders, including shareholders who previously held nonvoting shares.106 Given the company’s dualclass structure, this move would have resulted in diluting the voting power
of the controlling shareholder “from approximately 80% to 17%.”107 As
motives for this action, CBS cited, among other things, the ability to
“unlock signiﬁcant stockholder value” and “more fully evaluate strategic
alternatives.”108 For the purposes of this Article, CBS’s corporate action
matters because the distribution would have reallocated control rights
from the controlling shareholder to the minority. By distributing voting
shares to the current owners of its nonvoting stock, CBS would effectively
101. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp. 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
102. See Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *9, *21.
103. Id. at *9 (quoting GAMCO Asset Mgmt. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312-VCS, 2016
WL 6892802, at *16 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016)).
104. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720–22 (Del. 1971) (ﬁnding no selfdealing through a pro rata distribution of dividends, but noting that “[i]f such a dividend
is in essence self-dealing by the parent, then the intrinsic fairness standard is the proper
standard”).
105. At the time, CBS reported that its controlling shareholder NAI owned approximately
79.7% of the company’s Class A voting stock. See CBS Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at
13 (June 30, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828/000081382818000036/
cbs_10q-063018.htm [https://perma.cc/8Q2D-WJ5T] [hereinafter CBS Corp., June 2018
Quarterly Report]. The Sumner M. Redstone National Amusements Trust in turn owns eighty
percent of NAI’s voting interest and is itself controlled by the Redstone family. Id.
106. Press Release, CBS Corp., CBS Board of Directors Declares Dividend to Protect and
Give Voting Power to Stockholders (May 17, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/813828/000089882218000033/ex99.htm [https://perma.cc/5HYT-7DQH] [hereinafter
Press Release, CBS Corp.].
107. CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385, at *2
(Del. Ch. May 17, 2018).
108. Press Release, CBS Corp., supra note 106.
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accomplish the opposite of what Google, Facebook, and IAC wanted and
eliminate the majority voting power of its controlling shareholder, NAI.109
Unsurprisingly, NAI challenged the distribution in court.110 However, on
September 9, 2018, the parties announced they had settled the dispute.111
The above doctrinal review illustrates that while Delaware courts quite
consistently apply the entire fairness review and voluntary MFW conditions
to conﬂicts over cash-ﬂow rights, they have been unable to achieve a similarly coherent approach in the context of control rights conﬂicts. This
asymmetry prompts the question: Why? As the next Part explains, conﬂicts
over control rights have unique features that prevent the application of
the tools that have worked well in cash-ﬂow conﬂicts.
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF ALLOCATING CONTROL RIGHTS
Part I of this Article introduced the distinction between cash-ﬂow
rights and control rights and demonstrated that the Delaware courts have
struggled to fashion a consistent approach to address conﬂicts over the
reallocation of control rights. This Part argues that conﬂicts over the reallocation of control rights have two unique qualities that prevent their regulation like cash-ﬂow rights conﬂicts. First, section II.A explains that the
reallocation of control rights entails bargaining under conditions of a
bilateral monopoly over an inevitably dichotomous choice between giving
controllers a right to unilaterally reallocate control rights and giving
minority shareholders a right to veto such reallocation. Second, section
II.B shows that there are no acceptable methods, nor will there ever be, for
valuing reallocation of control rights, as the value of control rights is both
ﬁrm speciﬁc and individual speciﬁc. These realities make courts inherently
incapable of adjudicating conﬂicts over the reallocation of control rights.
A.

The Dichotomous Choice over Reallocation of Control Rights

To understand the dichotomous choice over the reallocations of control rights, one must ﬁrst ask: Why do entrepreneurs and investors care
about the allocation of control rights?
Entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them to pursue their idiosyncratic visions—the strategies that they genuinely believe
would produce abnormal returns for the company, thereby beneﬁting all
109. See generally Matt Levine, Opinion, CBS Wants to Get Rid of a Shareholder,
Bloomberg (May 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-05-15/cbswants-to-get-rid-of-a-shareholder [https://perma.cc/RW9H-D6S7] (explaining the effect of
CBS’s proposed dividend distribution). The pro rata distribution would have succeeded in
diluting NAI’s voting power primarily because NAI only owned around 10.4% of CBS’s nonvoting interest. See CBS Corp., June 2018 Quarterly Report, supra note 105.
110. See CBS Corp., 2018 WL 2263385, at *2. In this case, it was CBS that ﬁled the complaint asking for a temporary restraining order to prevent NAI from interfering with the
proposal by changing the composition of the board. Id. at *1–2.
111. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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shareholders.112 An entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision reﬂects the parts of
the entrepreneur’s business idea “that outsiders may be unable to observe
or verify.”113 Given that business ideas take time to implement and require
numerous decisions, ranging from day-to-day management issues to major
strategic choices, investors might disagree with entrepreneurs about the
company’s future direction—because of asymmetric information or differences of opinion—and prevent entrepreneurs from implementing their
visions.114 Thus, control over corporate decisions enables entrepreneurs to
pursue their visions even against investors’ objections. In other words, control matters for entrepreneurs mostly when investors might disagree with
the entrepreneurs’ decisions about the company’s direction. Investors, by
contrast, value control over corporate decisions because it offers protection against agency costs, like mismanagement and self-dealing.115
In controlled companies, the parties allocate control rights and cashﬂow rights with the aim of balancing the controller’s need to pursue an
idiosyncratic vision and minority shareholders’ need for protection against
agency costs. Allocating more control rights to controllers gives them more
freedom to pursue their idiosyncratic visions (if they are loyal and competent) and increases the risk of agency costs (if they are disloyal and incompetent); allocating more control rights to the minority has the opposite
effect.
At the initial contracting stage, such as the Initial Public Offering
(IPO), the parties negotiate under competitive conditions: The investors
can choose to invest elsewhere and the company may be considering multiple offers.116 Through the negotiation, the parties are able to reach an
acceptable balance between idiosyncratic vision and agency costs that ﬁts
their preferences and the nature of the business activity. If future developments prompt a need to shift the balance the parties achieved in their
initial allocation of control rights, the parties may reallocate control rights
midstream. Any reallocation of control rights midstream will again raise
the same tradeoff between idiosyncratic vision and agency costs that the
parties faced initially. Importantly, however, while in the initial stage the
parties negotiate the allocation of control rights under competitive condi-

112. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 566.
113. See id. at 567, 579 (“This could be because sharing the information with outsiders
would destroy its value (e.g., competitors could copy the idea) or simply because the entrepreneur can present outsiders with nothing more than her strong conviction concerning
the value of her idea.”).
114. See generally Eric Van den Steen, Disagreement and the Allocation of Control, 26 J.L.
Econ. & Org. 385 (2010) (exploring “the allocation of control under open disagreement”).
115. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 581–82 (describing
different forms of controllers’ agency costs).
116. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate
Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1825–29
(1989) (discussing differences in the contracting process at the IPO stage and the midstream stage).
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tions, midstream changes take place when the parties are locked in a bilateral monopoly.117 The parties, therefore, can only agree on who will have the
right to decide the new balance of idiosyncratic vision and agency cost.
Either controllers will receive the right to unilaterally reallocate control
rights, or minority shareholders will have a veto right over such decisions.
Sections II.A.1 and II.A.2 explore this tradeoff and discuss the consequences of giving either party control rights.
1. Controllers. — To understand the effect of granting either controllers or minority shareholders the right to determine midstream reallocations of control rights, consider the Google example.118 Google justiﬁed
the recapitalization on the basis that it would allow the controllers to continue to pursue their idiosyncratic visions while the company expands and
issues equity.119 Over time, Google explained, circumstances or business
strategy changed to an extent that required an adjustment to the original
allocation of control rights. Indeed, Google’s very success and fast growth
may be the kinds of changing circumstances that demand a reallocation
of control rights. Should the company’s proposal thus be accepted?
The reallocation of control rights is desirable only if the expected
beneﬁt—the future increase in company value—from preserving the controllers’ ability to pursue their idiosyncratic visions exceeds the likely
increase in agency costs that could arise from allowing the controllers to
preserve control with a lower fraction of the company’s equity.120 In other
words, if the parties choose to provide the controllers with the power to
unilaterally reallocate control rights, the minority shareholders might beneﬁt from the controllers’ ability to keep pursuing idiosyncratic visions, but
that beneﬁt comes at the cost of exposing minority shareholders to an
increased risk of agency costs. Clearly, it only makes sense to give the controllers the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights if the beneﬁt, as
judged by the parties ex ante, exceeds the cost.
Similarly, the agency costs that arise when the controller has the
power to unilaterally reallocate control rights are no different from any
other case of self-dealing: Even if a reallocation would not be in the best
interest of the company, controllers might pursue the recapitalization
anyway and reallocate control rights from the minority shareholders to
themselves. In other words, controllers might be motivated by a desire to
117. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
119. See infra section II.B.1.
120. For helpful background on this view, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman &
George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual-Class Equity: The Mechanisms
and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in Concentrated Corporate
Ownership 295, 301–05 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); see also In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting
Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962–VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016)
(“As control rights diverge from equity ownership, the controller has heightened incentives
to engage in related-party transactions and cause the corporation to make other forms of
non-pro rata transfers.”).
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entrench themselves while getting more liquidity rather than by a genuine
concern about their ability to pursue idiosyncratic visions. This is the
essence of the agency-costs risk.
2. Minority Shareholders. — Consider the alternative scenario: What if
the minority shareholders are given the power to decide about the reallocation of control rights? Recall that the reallocation is desirable if, and
only if, the expected beneﬁt from allowing the controller to pursue its
idiosyncratic vision exceeds the likely increase in agency costs. Given this
objective, empowering minority shareholders to veto a proposed recapitalization raises several issues.121
First, there is a clear tension between the fundamental justiﬁcation
for giving controllers more control and the requirement that minority
shareholders approve such reallocation of control rights. Leaving control
with the company’s founders is valuable solely because it allows them to
execute their idiosyncratic visions about the company’s future direction in
the face of disagreement from other investors. By its nature, idiosyncratic
vision is subjective and prone to differences of opinion between the controller and the minority shareholders, so persuading minority shareholders about the value of the founders’ idiosyncratic visions is challenging.
Thus, “[t]he risk of investors disrupting the entrepreneur’s pursuit of her
idiosyncratic vision exists even when the ﬁrm is publicly traded and investors are using stock prices as a proxy for the ﬁrm’s performance.”122
As a result, requiring minority shareholders’ approval is inconsistent
with the controller’s justiﬁcation for reallocating control rights. Controllers offer no “payment” for the reallocation, but instead offer an unenforceable, nonquantiﬁable promise that leaving control in their hands
would lead to better ﬁrm performance in the future.123 Minority shareholders must decide whether they believe that the founder’s idiosyncratic
vision is indeed so valuable as to justify the increased risk of agency costs.
The fact that the value of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision, by its very
deﬁnition, may not be fully appreciated by the minority shareholders
means that value-increasing reallocations of control rights may be
blocked.124

121. See Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. Rev.
1057, 1084–86 (2019) (explaining the difficulties associated with having minority shareholders vote on the extension of dual-class structures with sunset arrangements that automatically convert to single-class structures after a certain amount of time).
122. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 580.
123. Id. at 579.
124. The fact that the company is already public—that investors had the opportunity to
evaluate the founder’s performance—does not mean that investors surely know whether the
founder’s idiosyncratic vision is sufficiently valuable. See infra section II.B.2.
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Second, as already mentioned, this bargaining would take place
under conditions of a bilateral monopoly.125 That is, there is no readily available replacement to the controlling shareholder who is seeking extra
power in order to inﬂuence the direction of the company; the minority
shareholders cannot force out controllers and replace them with others.
The inherently subjective nature of idiosyncratic vision combined with the
dynamic of a bilateral monopoly increases the risk of a negotiation
breakdown.
To make concrete why the dynamic might lead to a negotiation breakdown, consider again the case of Google, but now assume that the proposed recapitalization requires the support of the Class A shareholders.
When negotiating with the controlling shareholder, these shareholders
will consider the expected beneﬁt (the impact on the company in terms
of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision) and the expected costs (agency
costs associated with the controller’s potential for abuse and the loss stemming from the decreased probability of Class A shareholders gaining control over the company). Assume that the Class A shareholders voted “no”
and that the controlling shareholders do genuinely believe that their idiosyncratic visions could substantially increase the value of the company.
What can the controllers do? They have limited options in such a scenario:
They can give up on the idiosyncratic vision by stopping the company from
raising capital for expanding, allow the company to expand and risk losing
their ability to implement their vision, or, if they can raise the resources,
resort to alternative transactions such as a freezeout.126
Taken together, these concerns suggest that while empowering minority shareholders will protect them from the risk of agency costs, it will also
increase the risk of frustrating the controller’s pursuit of idiosyncratic
vision.127 Therefore, the parties must choose between two imperfect
regimes: Allow the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights,
thereby protecting the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision while risking high
exposure to agency costs; or provide minority shareholders with a veto
right, thereby protecting against agency costs, but potentially sacriﬁcing
idiosyncratic vision. This tradeoff is inherent in the allocation of control
rights, and it requires the parties to estimate which risk is more costly—

125. The term “bilateral monopoly” refers to a situation “in which two parties must deal
with each other.” John Cirace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 Sw. L.J. 1139, 1149
(1990); Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 293,
298 (1992) (“[T]he relationship between a husband and a wife, or between the two parties
to an already executed contract, is a bilateral monopoly.”).
126. This predicament ex post explains why controllers may be unwilling, ex ante, to
give minority shareholders veto power over the reallocation of control rights.
127. This Article does not claim that minority shareholders will always reject the controller’s proposal. See, e.g., Anand, supra note 3, at 208–10 (describing a case in Canada in
which minority shareholders voted to allow the controller of Fairfax, a dual-class company,
to get more control rights subject to certain limitations). Rather, it argues that there is no
assurance that such a vote would lead to value-enhancing reallocations.
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exposure to agency costs or loss of idiosyncratic vision.128 Given that the
answer to this question is ﬁrm speciﬁc and individual speciﬁc, the parties
will have to make their choice ex ante based on their relative bargaining
position and accept whatever ex post consequences result from that
choice.
B.

The Impossibility of Valuing Control Rights

Section II.A has shown that the parties face an inevitable tension
between agency costs and idiosyncratic vision. This analysis raises the question: Can a third-party mechanism, such as judicial review, assist the parties
in reaching a better midstream allocation of control rights? This Article
argues that due to the impossibility of developing methods for valuing control rights, judicial review will be ineffective. Section II.B.1 demonstrates
that there is no acceptable economic method for valuing control rights,
and that economists are unlikely to develop such a method because these
rights are both ﬁrm speciﬁc and individual speciﬁc. Section II.B.2 explains
the difference between valuation and valuation models, and in so doing,
shows why average market premiums or the market’s reaction to a proposed reallocation of control rights cannot serve as substitutes for
valuation models.
1. Lack of Methodology to Value Control Rights. — Financial economics
does not provide a methodology for valuing different allocations of control rights over a corporation. We are aware of no method—least of all one
commonly accepted within the ﬁnancial community—for determining the
objective value of granting control over corporation A to individual B (as
opposed to individual C).129 The lack of acceptable methods for valuing
different allocations of control rights is not a matter of sheer coincidence.
Rather, this Article contends that ﬁnancial economists cannot devise a
workable methodology for valuing allocations of control rights because the
value of such allocations depends on ﬁrm-speciﬁc and individual-speciﬁc
attributes.
A key feature of common methodologies for valuing cash-ﬂow rights
is their ability to value assets independently of the individuals that control
these assets. The methods for valuing companies, for example, abstract
away from the person or entity that controls or manages these companies.
A ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows are capable of derivation from readily available
objective values,130 such as a ﬁrm’s exposure to systematic risk, debt-to128. Moreover, entrepreneurs and investors might attach different values to these risks.
See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 586 (“[A]gency costs and
idiosyncratic vision are not necessarily valued symmetrically. Thus, the entrepreneur might
proportionally value control rights much more than the increase in price that the investors
will demand due to their increased exposure to agency costs.”).
129. See supra note 27.
130. See, e.g., Jay W. Eisenhofer & John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 Del. J. Corp.
L. 37, 112–13 (1997) (describing DCF methodology and its use in calculating cash ﬂows);
see also Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart & David Wessels, McKinsey & Co., Valuation: Measuring
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equity ratios, expected revenue, and other ﬁnancial metrics, which are not
inherently tied to particular officers of the ﬁrm. This abstraction from
individual-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors is critical for turning these
methodologies into objective measures of value that can be generalized
and applied across different companies.131
However, the abstraction that is so critical for modeling cash-ﬂow
rights’ valuation cannot work in the context of control rights. The goal of
valuing the reallocation of control rights is to determine the value of a
speciﬁc company under the control of a speciﬁc individual. The decision at
issue in conﬂicts over reallocation of control rights is not between controlled ownership and dispersed ownership, but rather between giving
more, or less, control rights to Controller A, as opposed to Controller B.
Consequently, any methodology for valuing allocations of control rights
would have to determine the value of a speciﬁc entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision for a speciﬁc company, and the potential loss from agency
costs associated with granting more control to that individual, who might
abuse that control.
To demonstrate the central point here, consider the valuation challenges associated with the Google and Facebook recapitalizations. Recall
that these recapitalizations reallocated control rights by making it easier
for the founders to preserve their voting majority while the companies
continued to raise equity capital. In both cases, the companies’ principal
justiﬁcation for the recapitalization focused not on the price that the
founders paid for the reallocation of control rights but on the beneﬁt that
the new control structure allegedly would produce for the company and
its investors. Google argued that the recapitalization would allow its founders to continue steering the company without “becoming vulnerable to
short-term pressures,”132 and Facebook emphasized the vision of the company’s founder and the need to maintain a “long-term” focus.133 Operating
in the background for these companies was an additional concern that the
and Managing the Value of Companies 103–31 (5th ed. 2010) (describing “the most common DCF valuation models, with particular focus on the enterprise DCF model and the
economic-proﬁt model,” and detailing the calculation inputs and processes).
131. Some methodologies require ﬁrm-speciﬁc inputs: The DCF method for valuing
companies, for example, often relies on management projections about the company’s
future revenues, and these projections might reﬂect the past performance of those in control of the corporation. Yet, these methodologies do not purport to measure the likely contribution of speciﬁc individuals to company value.
132. Opening Pretrial Brief of Defendants Larry Page and Sergey Brin at 4–10, In re
Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. ﬁled June 10, 2013), 2013 WL
2728581 (“By holding their shares longer than other pre-IPO holders, the Founders now
have the ability, if they vote together, to elect directors who support Google’s long-term focus
and unique mission.”).
133. See Facebook, May 2016 Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 61 (“The Special
Committee and our board of directors believe that a signiﬁcant portion of the success realized by us has been attributable to Mr. Zuckerberg’s leadership, creative vision, and management abilities . . . . Mr. Zuckerberg’s continued leadership role in our company will
provide substantial beneﬁts to us and to our stockholders.”).
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risk of losing control would discourage their controllers from funding
growth by raising capital or making acquisitions. Taken together, both
companies claimed that the recapitalizations would increase their value.134
Given these justiﬁcations, the valuation would have to determine the
recapitalizations’ effect on the corporation—that is, the effect that facilitating the founders’ control over Facebook and Google would have on
company value. As explained above, incontestable control allows a
founder to pursue an idiosyncratic vision for the company even against
investors’ objections.135 At the same time, incontestable control increases
the risk of agency costs—the risk that controllers will use their dominant
positions to advance their own interests at the expense of the company or
its minority shareholders. Thus, any method for valuing control rights will
have to objectively evaluate individual-speciﬁc traits that are difficult to
observe—the controller’s idiosyncratic vision, competence to execute it,
and loyalty—within a ﬁrm-speciﬁc context.
The valuation of an idiosyncratic vision is on its own particularly difficult, as idiosyncratic vision is, by its very nature, a subjective view for
improvement of the ﬁrm that may run counter to market consensus. This
inquiry is forward looking and inherently individual speciﬁc. For instance,
the goal of the inquiry would be to determine the value of having Mark
Zuckerberg’s idiosyncratic vision, and not that of any other entrepreneur,
implemented at a speciﬁc company, Facebook (and not any other company).
Any model would therefore need to grapple with a particular individual’s
contribution to a particular ﬁrm.
The valuation of agency costs also poses challenges. The methodology
would have to assign a value to the effect that increased control has on
Zuckerberg’s agency costs—his likelihood of abusing control to expropriate
investors—and the likely impact of these agency costs on Facebook’s value.136
And there is yet another type of agency cost to evaluate: Recall that one of
the concerns underlying the recapitalizations is that, unless companies
make it easier for founders to preserve their control, the companies might
not raise more equity capital, thereby missing out on opportunities for
growth.137 A valuation would therefore have to assess both the value of
these growth opportunities and whether the recapitalization is necessary
134. See supra notes 132–133. Note that in Facebook’s case, the company also claimed
that Zuckerberg agreed to new restrictions on his control shares. This Article does not
address that point. See Facebook, May 2016 Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 61–62.
135. Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 590.
136. The Google plaintiffs’ pretrial brief seems to have recognized the difficulties of this
valuation. See Plaintiffs’ Opening Pretrial Brief at 55, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder
Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. ﬁled June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 2728583. Speciﬁcally, the plaintiffs argued that a controller “cannot take advantage of a run of success[,] even a long run
of success, to change a company’s corporate governance to give him permanent voting control,” lest courts “be stuck with the invidious task of deciding how much ‘success’ was enough
to justify entrenching management.” Id.
137. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
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for the company to pursue them. The extent to which controllers will
abuse their control, with or without the recapitalization, depends on a
myriad of speciﬁc characteristics, including the controllers’ identity and
personality, their liquidity position, the company’s industry, and so on.
Further, and even more difficult for accurate valuation, the model
would need to make forward-looking predictions. After all, Zuckerberg
may well be able to successfully execute his idiosyncratic vision today. However, a reallocation of control rights will have implications for Facebook
down the line, so any valuation model will have to consider Zuckerberg’s
loyalty and competence then as well as now. It is hard enough to evaluate
human behavior and determine an individual’s values and incentives on
the basis of today’s knowledge; it is even harder to predict human behavior
in the future.
Valuation techniques are simply not equipped to consider all of these
individual-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that are crucial for valuing control rights and yet very difficult to observe. Once one abstracts away from
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc and individual-speciﬁc features, there is no meaningful
metric left. In other words, the goal of valuing the reallocation of control
rights is to assign value to the expected idiosyncratic vision and expected
agency costs of a speciﬁc individual in the context of a speciﬁc company.
Abstracting away from individual-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc features—the
basic aspect that typically enables economists to perform valuation of cashﬂow rights—would contradict the precise goal of the valuation and render
it meaningless in the context of reallocation of control rights. Thus, there
is not, nor can there ever be, an economic methodology for determining
ﬁrm value under different allocations of control rights.
2. Valuations and Valuation Models. — Section II.B.1 argues that it is
inherently impossible to create valuation models for the reallocation of
control rights. This claim, however, does not imply that control rights do
not have value or that investors or other market actors do not value them.
Indeed, investors routinely engage in valuing control rights because these
rights affect idiosyncratic vision and agency costs, and hence ﬁrm value.138
But the fact that investors value control rights does not mean that there is
an objective valuation method that a competent court could use while
adjudicating a conﬂict over the reallocation of control rights. To see why,
this Article focuses on two methods by which control might be valued.
Section II.B.2.a discusses empirical studies that measure the average
premium paid for control across other ﬁrms. Section II.B.2.b discusses the
market’s reaction to a speciﬁc company’s reallocation of control.
a. Empirical Average Values of Control. — Empirical studies of control
measure, using different methods, the value that the market has assigned
138. John D. Finnerty & Douglas R. Emery, The Value of Corporate Control and the
Comparable Company Method of Valuation, 33 Fin. Mgmt. 91, 97 (2004) (describing different valuation methods that include the valuation of control rights because “[c]orporate
control accounts for a signiﬁcant portion of a ﬁrm’s value”).
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to control rights.139 In particular, studies have calculated the average premium paid in complete acquisitions of a ﬁrm in different industries,140 the
average premium paid for a control block in different countries,141 and the
average premium for the superior shares of dual-class ﬁrms in different
countries.142
As an illustration, assume that a ﬁrm is auctioned for sale.143 To determine what purchase price to offer, each potential bidder will estimate the
improvements that can be made to the ﬁrm (such as reducing the cost of
capital, cutting operational costs, or improving sales), the synergies that
can be attained with the bidder’s own business (such as costs savings due
to economies of scale or scope), and any idiosyncratic vision the bidder
might have. While it is possible to objectively estimate the potential
improvements144 and synergies,145 it is impossible to estimate the bidder’s
idiosyncratic vision, for the reasons discussed above. Nevertheless, each
bidder assesses the value of their idiosyncratic vision and reﬂects any such
value in their bid for the company. If there is more than one bid, the average control premium offered for the ﬁrm can be calculated. Similarly, with
a sample of several acquisitions, one can calculate the average control premium in an industry.146
Likewise, the average premium paid for control blocks reﬂects the fact
that when a controlling shareholder is selling its control block, potential
bidders will offer a premium for the same reasons as above, but may additionally do so for one other reason: Some bidders might include the
139. See, e.g., Avner Kalay, Oğuzhan Karakaş & Shagun Pant, The Market Value of
Corporate Votes: Theory and Evidence from Option Prices, 69 J. Fin. 1235, 1236 (2014)
(using option prices to estimate the market value of the shareholder voting rights associated
with a stock).
140. See generally, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The
Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 49
(1988).
141. See generally, e.g., Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Beneﬁts
from Control of Public Corporations, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 371 (1989); Alexander Dyck & Luigi
Zingales, Private Beneﬁts of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. Fin. 537 (2004).
142. See generally, e.g., Kristian Rydqvist, Takeover Bids and the Relative Prices of
Shares that Differ in Their Voting Rights, 20 J. Banking & Fin. 1407 (1996); Luigi Zingales,
What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Q.J. Econ. 1047 (1995).
143. This Article assumes that incumbent management would leave the business. Thus,
whatever idiosyncratic vision they have is no longer relevant.
144. See generally Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Control: Implications for Control
Premiums, Minority Discounts and Voting Share Differentials, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 487
(2012) (proposing a methodology to measure such premiums).
145. See generally Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Synergy (Oct. 30, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=841486 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(considering the various sources of synergy and categorizing them into operating and
ﬁnancial synergies).
146. See, e.g., George Alexandridis, Kathleen P. Fuller, Lars Terhaar & Nickolaos G.
Travlos, Deal Size, Acquisition Premia and Shareholder Gains, 20 J. Corp. Fin. 1, 2 (2013)
(offering a study of control premiums in a sample consisting of acquisitions of 3,691 U.S.
ﬁrms).
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private beneﬁts of control they intend to gain from expropriating the
minority in their offered bid price.147 Again, if there is more than one bidder, an average premium can be calculated, and given different transactions in control blocks, an average premium in a speciﬁc country can be
calculated.148
Lastly, empirical studies also calculate the premium at which the
superior-voting-class shares trade when a corporation has tradable dualclass shares.149 This premium reﬂects investors’ estimates of the potential
control premium they might receive or the potential cost they might suffer
because of agency costs.
Despite the existence of empirical studies measuring the value of premiums paid in each of the above cases, to date, no empirical study has
offered an objective method to evaluate control by a speciﬁc individual of
a speciﬁc company. The fact that investors value control and buyers of control are willing to pay a control premium does not imply that there is an
acceptable method for valuing different allocations of control rights over
a speciﬁc company.
More speciﬁcally, the fact that empirical studies can calculate the
average value of control in some markets cannot serve as a substitute for a
methodology that measures the effect of providing a speciﬁc individual
with more control over a speciﬁc company. In a midstream reallocation of
control rights, the value of the ﬁrm will increase if a competent and loyal
controller will succeed in attaining idiosyncratic vision. But the value
might decrease if incompetent and disloyal controllers simply pursue
agency costs, or loyal and competent controllers are simply wrong about
the value of idiosyncratic vision or about their ability to attain it.
Relying upon a calculation of the average premium paid for control
provides no help in this situation because by its very deﬁnition, the average
value of control in a given market will reﬂect every breed of controller—
the competent and incompetent, the successful and unsuccessful, as well
as the loyal and disloyal. Yet in a midstream reallocation of control rights,
the speciﬁc controller is arguing that they are loyal and that implementing
147. U.S. law allows controllers to sell their shares for a premium. See John C. Coffee,
Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient
Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 359, 360 (1996); Ronald
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785,
787 (2003) (describing the types of private beneﬁts that can be derived from control and
the possible limits on extracting these beneﬁts).
148. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
149. Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, 12
Rev. Fin. 51, 77–79 (2008) (reviewing the empirical studies on differences in market value
between high-vote and low-vote shares); Steven R. Cox & Dianne M. Roden, The Source of
Value of Voting Rights and Related Dividend Promises, 8 J. Corp. Fin. 337, 337–40 (2002)
(analyzing the relationship between different classes of stock and their corresponding
prices); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A CrossCountry Analysis, 68 J. Fin. Econ. 325, 344–45 (2003) (studying the difference in price
between high-vote and low-vote shares in eighteen countries).
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their idiosyncratic vision would produce above-market returns. That is, they
are arguing they are above the average. Thus, an average, as such, cannot
help a court when adjudicating such claims.150
b. Market Reaction to Reallocations of Control Rights. — In a publicly
traded company, any reallocation—or expected reallocation—of control
rights will be priced by the market. Indeed, when Google announced its
recapitalization, the market price of its publicly traded Class A shares
dropped, suggesting that the market viewed the speciﬁc decision to reallocate control rights to Brin and Page as unfavorable to Class A shares.151 In
the face of that market reaction, it is tempting to argue that changes in
companies’ stock prices should serve as an objective measure on which
courts could rely to determine the value of the reallocated control rights.
While the controller’s claim that they do have idiosyncratic vision can be
challenged on the grounds of bias, the market reaction is arguably unbiased; after all, investors were willing to accept a lower price for their shares
and exited.
However, the market reaction to the announcement about expected
reallocation of control rights cannot serve as an “objective” valuation
methodology.152 This follows from the fact that underlying the concept of
idiosyncratic vision is a fundamental disagreement with the market. This
disagreement is not necessarily about conﬂict (whether the controller is disloyal and thus lying about the need to get more control rights to pursue
idiosyncratic vision), but can also be about competence (whether controllers
are right about the value of their idiosyncratic vision and their ability to
attain it). Despite the market’s disagreement, (loyal) controllers seek to
retain control in order to execute their idiosyncratic visions because they
believe their idiosyncratic visions will increase the value of the company.
But by its very nature, idiosyncratic vision may not be accurately priced by
the market. Indeed, as explained earlier,153 this concern is an important
reason for controllers’ unwillingness to provide the market—minority
shareholders—with the power to veto reallocation of control rights. To
subject the reallocation of control rights to a valuation based on the market’s reaction to a proposed recapitalization would be to restate the fact
that the shareholders and the controller do not share the same opinion of
the controller’s vision. Using market prices as the methodology for valuing
150. The average could be useful in other contexts in which the idiosyncratic vision of
the manager is not at play. For instance, when claiming a negligent sale process of a ﬁrm
(Revlon breach), the average premium that could be attained in the industry could serve a
useful measure for damages.
151. See Jeremy C. Owens, Google Shares Drop on Stock-Split News, Mercury News
(Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.mercurynews.com/2012/04/13/google-shares-drop-on-stocksplit-news-2 [https://perma.cc/5A8J-BP42]; infra note 154.
152. Others have explained, in other contexts, why market prices should not be used
for valuation purposes. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price”
Appraisal Rule, 34 J.L. Econ. & Org. 543, 546 (2018).
153. See supra section II.A.2.
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reallocations of control rights would therefore be inconsistent with the
fundamental justiﬁcation for allocating control rights to founders. In fact,
using the market reaction would be tantamount to courts routinely accepting the valuation claim of one side to the litigation.
Moreover, according to the controller, shareholders that sold their
shares did so based on a misguided understanding of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision. To illustrate this point, ﬁrst note that from the announcement of the recapitalization on April 12, 2012 to April 13, 2012 the Google
share price dropped roughly 4.1% while the Nasdaq composite dropped
only about 1.4%, suggesting a “damage” of 2.7% to the value of Google.154
However, fast-forwarding ﬁve years, the shareholders who held, or bought,
the shares seem to have won out: While the Nasdaq composite rose
119.24%, Google shares rose 213.97%, beating the index by 94.73%.155
These facts are malleable and can be used by both parties in litigation
regarding a midstream reallocation of control rights. While the controllers
will argue that without the recapitalization Google would not have beaten
the market, the opposing minority shareholders will argue that Google
would have outperformed the market by an even greater percentage of
97.43% (94.73% + 2.7%), had they not reallocated control rights.156
Accordingly, although the selling shareholders choose to exit, their view
about the value of the reallocation of control rights cannot be determinative because they might be wrong. The possibility of error is especially
troubling in litigation that takes place immediately following the announcement of a recapitalization, before the effect of the recapitalization
has materialized.157 Thus, while controllers might sometimes overestimate
the value of their idiosyncratic vision, market reaction to reallocation of
control rights might also be wrong, and in any case, it is far from objective.
Finally, market reaction reﬂects investors’ assessment of the likely impact of the new allocation of control not only on company value, but also
154. Alphabet Inc. (GOOG): Historical Data, Yahoo Fin., https://finance.yahoo.com/
quote/GOOG/history?p=GOOG [https://perma.cc/5DCG-62QH] (start: Apr. 12, 2012; end:
Apr. 13, 2012); NASDAQ Composite (^IXIC): Historical Data, Yahoo Fin., https://finance.
yahoo.com/quote/%5EIXIC/history?p=%5EIXIC [https://perma.cc/C2Q3-HLYH] (start:
Apr. 12, 2012; end: Apr. 13, 2012).
155. Alphabet Inc. (GOOG): Historical Data, Yahoo Fin., https://ﬁnance.yahoo.com/
quote/GOOG/history?p=GOOG [https://perma.cc/WTQ7-DKUE] (start: Apr. 12, 2012;
end: Apr. 12, 2017); NASDAQ Composite (^IXIC): Historical Data, Yahoo Fin., https://
finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EIXIC/history?p=%5EIXIC [https://perma.cc/3RDA-HWTV]
(start: Apr. 12, 2012; end: Apr. 12, 2017).
156. Practically, it is hard to believe that the selling shareholders estimated that Google
would beat the market by 97.43%, and thus sold because 2.7% would be deducted from their
expected return after the recapitalization. Where could they realistically invest their money
instead and beat the market by more than 94%?!
157. Longer-term assessment of the value of such recapitalizations at other companies,
in order to identify their average effect on ﬁrm value, for example, would not serve as a
substitute for a valuation model. As explained above, judicial review in this context requires
an objective method for determining the value of a speciﬁc controller for a speciﬁc
company. See supra section I.A.1.

974

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:941

on minority investors’ expectation of gaining a portion of the control premium. To illustrate these two components of market reaction, consider
again the case of Google. When the recapitalization was announced,
Google’s share price dropped, reﬂecting at least some investors’ valuation
that reallocation of control rights to Brin and Page would not maximize
value for Google’s Class A shareholders. However, it is not at all clear why
the price dropped. Some shareholders did not trade, while some sold and
others bought. Were the shareholders who sold for a lower price willing to
do so because they feared higher agency costs? Or did the price drop to
reﬂect the lower likelihood that the market could eventually gain control
and attain the accompanying premium? For a method that will measure
the effect of different allocations of control rights on the value of Google,
a price drop because of fears of increased agency costs is relevant, but a
drop reﬂecting the loss of control expectations is not. After all, corporate
law recognizes the controllers’ entitlement to avoid actions that will lead
to their loss of control.158
Ultimately, as is explained in more detail below, the lack of an
acceptable methodology for valuing control rights means that judicial
review cannot assist controllers and minority shareholders in making
better decisions, ex post, about the reallocation of control rights.
III. RESOLVING CONTROL CONFLICTS
The unique features of the reallocation of control rights—a dichotomous choice made in a setting in which a bilateral monopoly is present
and acceptable methods for valuation are absent—has implications for the
role of corporate law in resolving disputes over the allocation of these
rights. This Part argues that the only appropriate response by courts when
addressing reallocations of control rights in controlled companies is to
treat the issue as a question of charter interpretation as to who has the
decisionmaking power, rather than as a question of self-dealing.
This Part begins by considering the application of Delaware’s entire
fairness standard—the regime that applies to self-dealing—to reallocations of control rights. Section III.A uses the example of the dual-to-tripleclass recapitalization to show that the entire fairness standard, in any form,
should not apply to conﬂicts over reallocation of control rights. The section then argues that any intermediate form of judicial review is also
unlikely to be desirable. Section III.B explains that Delaware courts should
regulate reallocations of control rights by deferring to the arrangement
settled upon in the charter. Where the charter does not offer an answer,
Delaware courts should apply the business judgment rule to midstream
reallocations of control rights.

158. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 602 (“As courts in
Delaware have long recognized, controllers cannot be forced to sell their control blocks
even when doing so would clearly beneﬁt the corporation or its minority shareholders.”).
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The Limits of Judicial Review

This section argues that Delaware courts’ approach for adjudicating
conﬂicts between controlling and minority shareholders is dependent on
the ﬁnancial community to develop valuation methodologies. Since no
methodologies exist for valuing reallocation of control rights, Delaware’s
existing approaches—the entire fairness review,159 voluntary MFW conditions,160 and intermediate scrutiny161—should not apply to the reallocation
of control rights.
1. Entire Fairness Review. — As explained above,162 Delaware’s regime
governing self-dealing—entire fairness review—critically relies on courts’
competence to value cash-ﬂow rights and determine their “fair price.”163
Under the entire fairness standard, controlling shareholders can engage
in self-dealing transactions without securing the approval of independent
directors or minority shareholders, as long as the transaction is subject to
a judicial determination of its fairness.164 Judicial review of a transaction’s
fairness has worked well in the context of cash-ﬂow rights conﬂicts, as economic theory has long developed methodologies—on which Delaware
courts rely—for valuing companies and other assets.
Subjecting midstream reallocations of control rights to entire fairness
review would require the court to assess the fairness of the new allocation
of control rights. However, as section II.B explains, there are no acceptable
methods on which courts can rely for valuing control rights. Moreover,
attempting to develop such methods is an inherently futile task because of
the subjective nature of control rights. Without valuation models to guide
courts, entire fairness review would be quite speculative: Courts would
have no reliable methodology for identifying value-enhancing reallocations of control rights, and the outcome of judicial review would be
unpredictable.165
Parties will not wish to rely on speculative and unpredictable judicial
review as it might fail to protect investors from agency costs, and it could
deter controllers with idiosyncratic visions from attempting to reallocate

159. See infra section III.A.1.
160. See infra section III.A.2.
161. See infra section III.A.3.
162. See supra section I.A.1.
163. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (“The concept of fairness
has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.”).
164. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 47–48 (Del. Ch. 2013) (holding
that although “the interests of the preferred and common stockholders were not aligned,”
the transaction was fair (quoting In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 1512–VCL,
2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009))).
165. Cf. Geeyoung Min, Governance by Business Decisions: Dividends and Shareholder
Voting 33–37 (Aug. 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (arguing that dividend distributions that reallocate control rights should be subject
either to enhanced scrutiny or to entire fairness review).
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control rights.166 Under the entire fairness standard, even controllers with
extremely valuable idiosyncratic visions would be subject to costly litigation.167 The deterrence effect on the controllers with valuable idiosyncratic
visions might be particularly acute given the likelihood that courts will
tend to underestimate the value of their idiosyncratic vision. As courts
know, all controllers have an incentive to claim that they have an extremely
valuable idiosyncratic vision, but many of them will be objectively wrong
about the value of their idiosyncratic visions and their ability to attain
them, and some of them will simply be lying. These realities might bias
courts against ﬁnding that the expected value of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision exceeds the risk of agency costs.
166. To see why, assume there are 100 controlled ﬁrms in the market, each with a controller who owns 15% of the equity. Of these 100, twenty-ﬁve will wish to reallocate control
rights, and assume further that while in ﬁve of these ﬁrms the controllers have idiosyncratic
vision (“A ﬁrms”), in twenty of them controllers would merely exploit private beneﬁts of
control (“B ﬁrms”). If one of the twenty B ﬁrms reallocates control rights, the controller
will inﬂict damage due to agency costs, ranging from $2 to $30, with an average of $20. If
one of the ﬁve A ﬁrms with the truly exceptional controllers reallocates control rights it will
add $100 in ﬁrm value, out of which $15 will accrue to the controller because of their equity.
To understand the deterrent effect of unpredictable valuations, assume a controller needs
to ﬁrst go through with an irreversible reallocation of control rights and thereafter, using
an unpredictable valuation method, the court submits the bill, which requires the controller
to pay damages if the allocation is found to be unfair. Given that twenty out of twenty-ﬁve
ﬁrms will have agency costs, in each litigation, there is an 80% probability that the court will
ﬁnd the allocation to have been unfair. Thus, in 20% of the cases the court will believe that
the controller has idiosyncratic vision and the bill will be zero, while in 80% of the cases the
bill will be positive and will randomly range from $2 to $30, though still maintaining an
average of $20. How would that affect the behavior of controllers? The worst controllers,
those who inﬂict $30 in damage, will go through with the reallocation. The “worst” that can
happen to them is that the court submits the correct bill of $30 and they break even. Any
lower bill will represent a windfall and this windfall will arrive with a high probability (20%
probability to keep the $30 and 80% probability to pay back $30 or less). Controllers with
idiosyncratic vision will be deterred, even if they are not risk averse. If the court recognizes
their idiosyncratic vision (20% probability), the bill will be zero and they can increase value
and collect their share of the gain, $15. If the court is mistaken (80% probability), then they
might receive a bill with an average value of $20. For the controller with idiosyncratic vision
the expected value of the reallocation is negative ((20% x $15) – (80% x $20) = -$13). Once
all the ﬁve A ﬁrms are deterred, and all the controllers within the twenty B ﬁrms that might
consume less than $20 in private beneﬁts are also deterred, the court will adjust the average
upward until even the worst controllers are deterred. This “equilibrium” of entire fairness
valuations will practically evolve into a ﬂat prohibition of reallocation of control rights. The
result will damage diversiﬁed shareholders and the market. The prohibition blocks twenty
ﬁrms from inﬂicting a total damage of $400 at the price of losing the $500 increase in value
of the ﬁve ﬁrms with idiosyncratic vision.
The situation is not going to improve if, as it might be the case in reality, controllers
can reverse course and cancel the reallocation after the court declines to ﬁnd idiosyncratic
vision and issues an injunction. See infra note 202.
167. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 534 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom.
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“[A]bsent the ability . . . to bring
an effective motion to dismiss, every case has settlement value, not for merits reasons, but
because the cost of paying an attorneys’ fee to settle litigation . . . exceeds the cost in terms
of dollars and time consumed of going through the discovery process . . . .”).
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Moreover, loyal controllers with a genuine belief in the value of their
idiosyncratic vision may expect to beneﬁt from a reallocation mostly
through their pro rata share of any positive effect such reallocation would
have on ﬁrm value. Courts, however, might insist on having the controller—and not the company—bear the cost if the reallocation is found to be
unfair.168 Thus, entire fairness litigation might place the competent and
loyal controller at an inherent disadvantage.169
Ultimately, the possibility that courts will be unsympathetic to a controlling shareholder’s claim of idiosyncratic vision will have a deterrent
effect, which will transform the entire fairness standard into a de facto
requirement to receive majority-of-minority support to avoid the uncertainty of the valuation. With the odds stacked against them in this way, a
controlling shareholder is left with no meaningful choice other than to
seek MFW protection. In other words, although the controller is formally
allowed to unilaterally reallocate control rights, practically, because of the
lack of objective valuation methods, minority shareholders will always be
given a veto right because a sensible controlling shareholder will make a
reallocation of control contingent on their approval.
An inherently speculative and unpredictable judicial valuation is
unlikely to reduce either the risk of agency costs or that of losing idiosyncratic vision. To the contrary, it will add litigation costs and an additional
risk of judicial mistakes. Subsequently, courts’ inability to value control
rights means that they should not assess the fairness of reallocations of
control rights. In the absence of economic models for valuing different
allocations of control rights, there is no reason to expect judicial review to
produce an optimal allocation of these rights. The parties cannot rely on
judicial review to ameliorate the inherent tension they face and must
therefore themselves choose between the risk of high agency costs and that
of losing idiosyncratic vision.
2. Voluntary MFW Conditions. — The analysis so far has assumed that
subjecting midstream reallocations of control rights to judicial review
would require courts to value the new allocation of control rights. One
may argue, however, that this assumption overlooks the current state of
Delaware’s entire fairness regime. After all, Delaware courts often forgo
entire fairness review (and judicial valuation) by encouraging controlling

168. During the Google settlement hearing, the court repeatedly criticized the failure
to have the founders personally share the settlement costs. For example, see Settlement
Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *27, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“So what you’re telling me here in
terms of the settlement is that the founders who wish to retain voting control but not by
continuing to purchase shares with an economic interest and preserving that voting control
that way, they’re not taking any haircut in this.”).
169. Limiting courts to issuing only injunctions might mitigate the deterrence of controllers. But, as explained in note 166, supra, and in note 202, infra, such a regime might
still produce undesirable outcomes.
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shareholders to voluntarily condition the execution of a self-dealing transaction upon receiving the support of a majority of the minority shareholders and the approval of an independent special committee. With these
conditions—the MFW conditions170—in place, courts will grant the deal
review under the deferential business judgment standard and accordingly
abstain from assessing the fairness of the transaction.171 At ﬁrst blush, this
regime ostensibly sidesteps the problems inherent in judicial valuation of
control rights: The majority-of-minority requirement relies on the minority shareholders’ competence to value the proposed transaction, and
courts only supervise the approval process to ensure that it was uncoerced,
informed, and that a majority of disinterested shareholders approved the
deal.172 This section explains why the MFW conditions of the Delaware
regime, by themselves, cannot overcome the need for a reliable model to
guide courts in valuing control rights.
a. Majority-of-Minority Condition. — Delaware doctrine does not require
controllers to subject a self-dealing transaction to a vote by minority shareholders. Rather, it provides the controller with an option: The controller
can either subject the transaction to a vote by minority shareholders or
have the court review the transaction for its fairness.173 The controller will
therefore compare the possible outcome of negotiating with minority
shareholders—including the risk of a negotiation failure—against the outcome that judicial valuation is likely to produce. If the controlling shareholder anticipates that minority shareholders will behave strategically and
hold out for an unreasonable price or fail to approve a value-enhancing
transaction for any other reason, the controller can avoid the negotiations
altogether, force the transaction upon the minority, and simply opt to show
in court that the price is fair under the entire fairness review.174
Moreover, minority shareholders’ willingness to approve the proposed transaction will also be affected by the controller’s option to “walk
away” from negotiations and go forward with the transaction without the
minority’s approval. In other words, under Delaware’s voluntary MFW
conditions, both parties, the controller and the minority shareholders,
negotiate “in the shadow” of Delaware’s fair-price requirement. This judicial benchmark affects the parties’ bargaining strategies, as each side will

170. See supra section I.A.2.
171. See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 502.
172. See, e.g., id. at 525–26.
173. See Edward B. Rock, Majority of the Minority Approval in a World of Active
Shareholders, in The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions 105, 115 (Luca
Enriques & Tobias Tröger eds., 2019).
174. For a discussion of the link between controllers’ need to test the market and the
requirement that the controller adopt the majority-of-minority condition at the outset of
negotiations, see William Lawlor & Michael Darby, Synutra—A Practical Application of MFW
or a Free Look for Controlling Stockholders?, Harv. Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance,
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/08/synutra-a-practical-application-of-mfw-or-a-freelook-for-controlling-stockholders [https://perma.cc/PR79-YL9Q].
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base its demands on its estimate of the valuation result a court would reach
if it were asked to determine the “fair price.”175 The judicial backstop, resting on both parties’ ability to predict how the court will evaluate the deal,
incentivizes both the controlling and minority shareholders to reach an
agreement. The looming presence of judicial valuation also prevents a
negotiation breakdown, as the controller cannot offer too little and the
minority cannot demand too much compared to the predictable outcome
of “entire fairness” review.176 The dynamic changes, however, when courts
cannot objectively value control rights. When both parties lack conﬁdence
in courts’ ability to objectively value control rights, the shadow of credible
judicial valuation evaporates and the incentive to remain at the bargaining
table is dramatically curtailed. Neither party can predict what the “fair
price” will be, which renders the focal point of the negotiation elusive.
This analysis shows that Delaware’s partial reliance on some type of
veto right for minority shareholders to regulate self-dealing is in fact more
dependent on accurate valuation than may be immediately apparent.
Thus, Delaware’s most recent approach to the reallocation of control
rights is problematic. In Crane, the court held that entire fairness applied,
and used the MFW conditions to reduce the level of review to business
judgment.177 Given NRG’s successful implementation of the MFW conditions, the court was not required to assess the recapitalization’s fairness.178
However, if NRG had failed to condition the recapitalization on a vote by
minority shareholders, the court would have been left in the position of
reviewing the reallocation of control rights under entire fairness.179 But
without a valuation model, how could the court determine whether the
reallocation was indeed fair?
Moreover, Crane was an exceptional case in which the controller was
likely to secure the majority-of-minority vote without the difficulties identiﬁed above.180 The company in Crane was an entity that owned incomeproducing energy assets.181 It had no management of its own and instead
175. Indeed, an empirical study has found that the premium paid under the MFW procedure is similar to the premium determined by courts under the entire fairness process.
See Fernán Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and Deal Outcomes in
Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW 24 (Jan. 19, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3105169 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
176. In other words, the ability to turn to the Delaware courts for an objective valuation
makes the parties more likely to reach an agreement in which the minority “sells” litigation
insurance to the controlling shareholder in exchange for a larger percentage of the surplus
value generated by the deal. Goshen, supra note 47, at 429.
177. See supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text.
178. IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. CV 12742-CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *9
(Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017).
179. The same result would follow if Delaware chose to afford the recapitalization business judgment deference and the company had failed to meet one of the required conditions for such review. See infra note 213.
180. See supra section I.B.2.
181. Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *1–2.
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relied on its controlling shareholder, through a “Management Services
Agreement,” to manage its day-to-day affairs, including placing new energy
assets, which are routinely and easily evaluated, into the company.182 Thus,
in Crane, the need for the operator to preserve control as the company
continued to acquire assets was an operational issue rather than a question
of idiosyncratic vision.183 That is, the controller was not making appeals to
the company’s vision as Page and Brin were in Google’s case, but rather to
the need to ensure that Crane’s regular operations were run successfully.
In this way, Crane was an anomalous situation because it was easy to explain
to the minority shareholders that reallocation of control rights was needed
to prevent the fairly immediate negative consequences that could result if
the controller-operator lost control. In other cases, however, where the
controller’s idiosyncratic vision is at issue, persuading minority shareholders to vote for the reallocation of control rights will not be as easy.184
To summarize, the MFW majority-of-minority condition takes on a different meaning when courts cannot evaluate the fairness of the underlying
transaction. As explained above, the parties must choose between allowing
the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights and subjecting the
reallocation to a veto right by minority shareholders. If courts require the
majority-of-minority support to avoid valuation of reallocation of control
rights, then in cases in which the parties gave the controller the right to
unilaterally reallocate control rights, the judicial requirement practically
overrules the parties’ choice by mandating a veto right to the minority
shareholders.
b. Special Independent Committee. — In addition to voluntarily asking
for majority-of-minority support as explained above, under MFW, controllers that wish to avoid entire fairness review must empower a special committee of independent directors to negotiate the transaction and approve
its terms.185 Indeed, the requirement that independent directors approve
decisions that raise conﬂicts of interest is common in corporate law.186
However, in the context of reallocation of control rights, even this requirement is problematic.

182. Id. at *2.
183. See id. at *3–4 (describing the company’s dependence on the controlling shareholder as a source of assets).
184. See supra section I.B.2.
185. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 517 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn
v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); see also supra notes 171–172 and
accompanying text.
186. For example, in both Crane and the Google settlement, courts emphasized the signiﬁcance of having the recapitalization negotiated and approved by a special committee of
independent directors. See Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *9 (suggesting that the presence of
well-motivated and truly independent directors might play an important role in determining
the scope of judicial review); supra note 94 (describing then-Chancellor Strine’s acknowledgement that approval of the recapitalization plan by Google’s independent directors was
the company’s strongest argument for adjusting the standard of review).
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Ideally, a special committee of independent directors should verify
that the controller indeed has the idiosyncratic vision to justify the higher
risk of agency costs that come with a reallocation of control rights. This
means that the usefulness of a special independent committee depends on
its ability to ascertain the real value of idiosyncratic vision, which requires
that such vision be veriﬁable. But, because of the subjective nature of
idiosyncratic vision, it is inherently nonveriﬁable.187 Otherwise there would
be few differences of opinion between controllers and minority shareholders. Moreover, for the reasons explained in section II.B, directors—
like courts—would be unable to rely on valuation experts to offer an
objective assessment of the value of the company under the new allocation
of control rights. If it were possible to generate such an objective valuation,
courts would also be able to do so.
As a result, the role of a special committee of independent directors
would ultimately boil down to deciding whether to put their faith in the
controller’s claims based on their knowledge of the controller’s competence and integrity. While the directors’ access to nonpublic information
may allow them to observe the controller’s behavior on a variety of occasions, there is nothing to suggest that independent directors enjoy any
advantage over Delaware’s judges in decoding the human traits relevant
here: competence (vision) and integrity (agency costs). As such, the inherent tension between idiosyncratic vision and agency costs will render the
special independent committee impractical, as the directors’ mere trust in
the controller cannot translate to validation of the existence of idiosyncratic vision.
Lastly, Delaware’s tendency to focus on the process of the independent
special committee might transform the process into a “cosmetic” negotiation solely aimed at meeting the judicial desire to see give-and-take
between the controllers and the independent directors.188 To illustrate,
consider the Facebook and Google recapitalizations. Although the true
consideration for the reallocation of control rights is the promise of
increased value, the independent directors in these cases negotiated for
187. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 601 (“[A]symmetric information and differences of opinion could prevent the controller-entrepreneur from
credibly communicating her idiosyncratic vision not only to investors, but also to skeptical
independent board members.”). Another concern is independent directors’ dependence
on the controller for continued service at the company. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra
note 46, at 1274.
188. When the board approves a corporate action that amounts to doing the controller
a favor, such as waiving transfer of control conditions to facilitate the sale of the controller’s
shares, courts have required that the board negotiate receiving something in return. See,
e.g., In re Digex Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1210–11 (Del. Ch. 2000) (ﬁnding that
the defendant company was likely to fail the fair dealing prong of ﬁduciary duty because
independent directors were “kept powerless” to affect negotiations in a merger proposal
controlled by interested directors). In the context of reallocation of control rights, however,
controllers are not asking for a favor, but rather for a corporate action they believe would
beneﬁt the company.
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“concessions” from the controllers in the form of additional contractual
restrictions on their control rights.189 Yet, when these concessions are seriously considered, it becomes evident that they were merely put in place to
satisfy the court’s desire to see some compromise between the parties.
In sum, the lack of valuation methods for reallocation of control
rights limits judicial application of the voluntary MFW conditions, as the
tools of entire fairness used to resolve cash-ﬂow rights conﬂicts will not
work in the context of control rights conﬂicts.
3. The Intermediate Approach. — One might wonder if this Article goes
too far in eliminating judicial review. Even if entire fairness cannot be applied in the absence of objective valuation methodologies, the argument
goes, perhaps courts could still play a useful role in adjudicating disputes
over the reallocation of control rights. Under this view, courts could adopt
an intermediate standard of review—one in between entire fairness and
business judgment—that does not require valuation, to prevent controllers
from overreaching. Consequently, this view reasons, intermediate review
by Delaware’s equity court would avoid the complexities of entire fairness
valuations while arguably preventing at least some egregious cases in which
midstream reallocations are driven purely by agency costs.
This approach is familiar to corporate law scholars. Delaware courts
have implemented intermediate standards of review in other contexts in
which business judgment review seems too deferential and the entire fairness standard seems too strict. For example, in assessing defensive
measures that directors take in response to a hostile takeover, Delaware
requires the board to show a good faith determination that there was a
threat and that the defense was proportional (the Unocal test).190 In
assessing a board action that interferes with shareholders’ voting rights,
Delaware courts require that the board show a compelling justiﬁcation
(the Blasius test).191 The main role of these intermediate tests is to provide
pre-transaction litigation, in which courts typically either block the deal or
let it go through because of some legal standard rather than because of an
objective valuation.
At least at ﬁrst glance, the intermediate standard seems to avoid judicial valuation issues and achieve an improved balance between the risks
that parties aim to minimize: high agency costs and the loss of idiosyncratic
189. See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text.
190. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
191. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (explaining
that when a board action is “done for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of
stockholder voting power” past cases have articulated that “the board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justiﬁcation for such action”). Delaware courts use a
similar approach to evaluate board decisions to sell control of a company (the Revlon test).
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)
(“[W]hen bidders make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes
inevitable, the directors cannot fulﬁll their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with
the contending factions.”).
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vision. A closer look at the Delaware courts’ application of these intermediate standards, however, highlights their inherent shortcomings. Consider, for instance, the Blasius standard, which requires that a corporate
board have a compelling justiﬁcation when the primary purpose of a corporate action is to interfere with the shareholders’ vote.192 Indeed, it was
already clear from the facts of Blasius itself that even a good faith attempt
to protect the ﬁrm from a ﬁnancial disaster would not satisfy the compelling justiﬁcation test.193 As courts have acknowledged the practical impossibility of providing a goal that would satisfy Blasius’s requirements, their
focus has shifted from the board’s goal to the means that it used to accomplish the challenged interference with a shareholder vote.194 The test has
evolved into a list of permitted and prohibited actions, allowing the board
to regulate but not dictate the shareholder vote.195 Scholars and judges seem
to agree that, in the already very limited circumstances when the Blasius
standard applies, cases in which the court has found the compelling justiﬁcation burden met are exceedingly rare, if not entirely nonexistent.196
Thus, in the Blasius context, the intermediate standard of review simply
means a judicially imposed prohibition on board interference with the
shareholder vote.
The other form of intermediate scrutiny, the Unocal test, focuses on
the motives of the boards that use defensive measures.197 Since a welladvised board can prepare an adequate paper trail showing the right

192. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661.
193. Id. at 653–59 (ﬁnding that the board acted “in a good faith effort to protect its
incumbency, not selﬁshly, but in order to thwart implementation of the recapitalization that
it feared, reasonably, would cause great injury to the Company”).
194. David C. McBride & Danielle Gibbs, Interference with Voting Rights: The
Metaphysics of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 927, 942 (2001) (“The
court never has found a justiﬁcation sufficiently compelling to permit a board to thwart the
shareholder franchise.”).
195. Compare Pell v. Kill, 135 A.3d 764, 789 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Pell has established a
reasonable probability of showing successfully that the Board Reduction Plan is preclusive.
Pell has therefore established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits on a claim
for breach of ﬁduciary duty under the enhanced scrutiny standard.”), with Mercier v. InterTel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[D]irectors fearing that stockholders
are about to make an unwise decision that [risks the stockholders] . . . irrevocably los[ing]
a unique opportunity to receive a premium for their shares have a compelling justiﬁcation—
the protection of their stockholders’ ﬁnancial best interests—for a short postponement in
the merger voting process . . . .”).
196. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
197. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). Some
defensive measures such as a poison pill indirectly affect shareholders’ voting rights (preventing some shareholders from increasing their ownership of voting shares), and reallocation of control rights could also be viewed in such a way (preventing control from shifting
to the market).
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motives, the Unocal standard has essentially evolved into business judgment review for companies that hire sophisticated counsel.198 Thus, in the
Unocal context, the intermediate standard of review simply means a judicially imposed default rule according to which the use of defensive
measures is allowed.
The failings of existing intermediate standards to produce meaningful judicial review should be instructive. Any prospect that subjecting midstream allocation of control rights to an intermediate standard of review
would provide a silver bullet seems to ﬂy in the face of Delaware’s actual
practice. Assume, like in Unocal, that the intermediate test used to regulate
control rights focuses on both the motives of the controllers, as well as the
process used to make the decision.199 A well-advised controller can always
prepare the “right” paper trail to show a good motive for maintaining control: the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision. And, as explained above, by its very
nature the objective value of idiosyncratic vision—or even its existence—
cannot be veriﬁed by courts.200 This means that only the poorly advised or
naive controllers will be captured by the test. The same fate awaits any
process-related inquiry. In this regard, the story of Facebook is illuminating. There, the plaintiffs alleged, after discovery, that the special committee procedure had been compromised in part because one of the members
of the committee had sent Mark Zuckerberg text messages updating him
on the status of the special committee’s meetings.201 Even if the litigation
had continued and Delaware had in fact found that the special committee
was compromised, the next well-advised company proposing a recapitalization would learn the lesson and quickly avoid Facebook’s mistake.
The same outcome can be expected if the intermediate test takes the
approach of Blasius and focuses on the goal of reallocating control rights.
Indeed, one might think that reallocations of control rights could be
198. Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. Pa. J. Bus.
L. 599, 617 (2013) (“Underneath this veneer of judicial review, however, is convincing evidence that Delaware courts, in reality, heavily defer to the decision of the target directors.”);
see also Mercier, 929 A.2d at 810 (“[S]ome of the prior Unocal case law gave reason to fear
that that standard, and the related Revlon standard, were being denuded into simply another
name for business judgment rule review.” (footnotes omitted)).
199. See, e.g., Air Products v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 103 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting that
the ﬁrst prong of Unocal requires directors-defendants to show that after “reasonable investigation” they determined in “good faith” that the bidder’s offer presented a threat).
200. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. One might argue that the success of
the company could indicate the value of the entrepreneur’s vision. Yet, business failures
(temporary or not) do not necessarily imply that the entrepreneur lacks vision. In fact, control matters for the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision precisely when investors or markets believe
that the controller’s vision is wrong.
201. See Deepa Seetharaman & Sarah E. Needleman, Facebook Abandons Plans to
Change Share Structure, Avoiding Lawsuit, Wall St. J. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/facebook-abandons-plans-to-change-share-structure-avoiding-lawsuit-1506114877 (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“In one instance, Mr. Andreessen texted Mr. Zuckerberg
during a March meeting of the special committee with progress reports. ‘NOW WE’RE
COOKING WITH GAS,’ Mr. Andreessen wrote.”).
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viewed through the Blasius framework as an incident of interference with
shareholder voting rights. Again, well-advised controllers will state and
demonstrate the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision as their goal. As the court
in Blasius rejected the board’s good faith goal of avoiding ﬁnancial disaster
as a qualiﬁed compelling justiﬁcation, there is no reason to think that the
goal of pursuing idiosyncratic vision would be treated differently. However,
in cases of reallocation of control rights the court will not be able to come
up with a list of permitted and restricted actions because all reallocations
have the same effect of shifting control from one group of shareholders to
another. And the court cannot prohibit all reallocations of control rights,
as such a ruling will run counter to the parties’ agreement to allow the
controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights in genuine cases of pursuit of idiosyncratic vision. Practically, an intermediate test will gradually
transform into business judgment review.
One might argue that the risk of intermediate litigation, on its own,
might deter some disloyal controllers from ever trying to go through with
opportunistic reallocation of control rights. After all, lawyers cannot justify
every action, and the need to persuade professional courts, with the costs
involved in the process, might deter some expropriation from taking
place. However, this speculative beneﬁt should be weighed against the
potential costs arising out of possible judicial mistakes. In the absence of a
methodologically sound tool for distinguishing between “good” and “bad”
reallocations of control rights, the likelihood of mistakes is very high.
Thus, the prospect of costly litigation under an intermediate standard of
review will deter even legitimate, value-maximizing reallocations by controllers with idiosyncratic vision. Given the high probability of mistakes,
even if all controllers litigate midstream reallocations and courts merely
engage in judicial screening—granting injunctions or allowing the action
to go through—an intermediate standard of review might harm the market by allowing some “bad” reallocations to go through and stopping some
“good” ones.202
202. To see why, assume again that there are 100 controlled ﬁrms in the market traded
at $100 each. See supra note 166. As previously stipulated in this Article, only twenty-ﬁve of
the 100 would wish to reallocate control rights, and of those twenty-ﬁve, only ﬁve have controllers with idiosyncratic vision. If one of these ﬁve ﬁrms reallocates control rights it would
add $100 in ﬁrm value. However, in the other twenty ﬁrms, any reallocation of control rights
would result in the controller inﬂicting an average of $20 damage due to agency costs.
Courts are aware that only ﬁve out of twenty-ﬁve ﬁrms would have idiosyncratic vision. Thus,
there is a 20% probability that courts will believe that a controller has idiosyncratic vision
and would allow a reallocation to go through, while in 80% of the cases the court will issue
an injunction against the reallocation of control rights. To underscore the dangers of an
erroneous determination, notice the outcome of applying the statistical probabilities
assumed above within each group. If 80% of the twenty ﬁrms that yield high agency costs
and 80% of the ﬁve ﬁrms that yield gains from idiosyncratic vision come before the court,
the following is the result: Courts would likely block sixteen of the ﬁrms that have no idiosyncratic vision (avoiding $320 in damage), but they would also block four of the ﬁrms with
idiosyncratic vision (losing $400 in value). At the same time, taking 20% from each of the
groups, courts would likely allow four ﬁrms (20% of twenty) with agency costs to go through

986
B.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:941

Implications for Corporate Law

Section III.A argues that Delaware courts should not review reallocations of control rights for their fairness or institute a new intermediate
standard of review. This section claims that this leaves courts with the task
of determining whether the controller has the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights. If the court ﬁnds that the controller has the power
to make a midstream reallocation of control rights without the need for a
vote by minority shareholders, then it should apply the business judgment
rule.203 Otherwise, the court should enforce the right of the minority
shareholders to veto the reallocation.
1. Deferring to the Parties’ Choice. — Controllers and minority shareholders face an inherent tradeoff between two opposing concerns. On the
one hand, allowing the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights
might lead to opportunistic control allocations that would beneﬁt the controller without increasing company value. On the other hand, a requirement that minority shareholders approve reallocations of control rights
might lead to a bargaining failure and prevent controllers from realizing
their idiosyncratic visions. As explained above, judicial review cannot ameliorate this tension. Instead, the parties must themselves choose between
imperfect alternatives by agreeing ex ante on the rule that will govern midstream reallocations of control rights. They can either agree that the controller will hold the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights or that
the minority’s approval is required, for example, by including a charter
provision to that effect. In the ﬁrst case they protect idiosyncratic vision,
by strengthening the controllers’ freedom to pursue their idiosyncratic
visions for the company regardless of investors’ views, and risk agency
costs, by increasing the controllers’ abilities to expropriate control. In the
second case, they minimize the risk of agency costs but risk losing idiosyncratic vision.
This Article takes no position on the optimal allocation of the power
to reallocate control rights, as it is inherently ﬁrm speciﬁc and individual
speciﬁc. In our view, the best approach for corporate law is to (1) allow the

(allowing $80 in damage) and one ﬁrm (20% of ﬁve) with idiosyncratic vision to go through
(keeping $100 value). This would damage the market as courts will avoid $340 in damages
(preventing $320 in agency costs and preserving $20 in value) at the cost of losing $400 in
idiosyncratic vision. Since these mistakes reduce value (blocking idiosyncratic vision or
allowing agency costs), this result is damaging even to shareholders holding a diversiﬁed
portfolio.
203. See supra section III.A. One could argue that the parties may incorporate the prospect of judicial review into their initial allocation of the power to reallocate control rights.
For example, minority shareholders might leave the power with the controller under the
assumption that its use of the power will be constrained by judicial review. As this Article
explains, however, it is highly unlikely that the parties would like to subject midstream reallocation of control rights to judicial review based on an unreliable method for assessing
fairness. See id.
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parties ex ante to determine who should have the power to reallocate control rights and (2) judicially settle ex post disputes about whether the controller has the power to reallocate these rights without a vote by minority
shareholders. The principal task of courts is therefore to determine
whether the controller can reallocate control rights without receiving the
approval of the minority shareholders.
In some cases, the parties may expressly address the question in the
company’s charter or other foundational document. For instance, the
charter may require that minority shareholders approve any reallocation
of control rights by providing that certain charter amendments receive a
supermajority vote or, in the case of a dual-class company, a so-called class
vote.204 Alternatively, the charter may expressly authorize the controller to
make future changes without a vote by the majority-of-the-minority.205 If
controllers and investors agree ex ante on an allocation of control in the
corporate charter that empowers the controller to recapitalize the ﬁrm,
subsequent judicial rewriting of this allocation runs directly counter to the
ex ante motivation for entering into this type of arrangement. Courts
should not determine the fairness of midstream reallocations or review the
motives of the controller. The only role for courts faced with disputes over
the reallocation of control rights is to enforce the parties’ arrangement for
who has the power to reallocate control rights.206 When the controller has
the right to unilaterally reallocate control rights, the business judgment
rule should apply to its decision to reallocate these rights. In other words,
the controller’s conﬂict of interest notwithstanding, courts should not
treat the reallocation as self-dealing. As explained in Part II, the lack of
acceptable valuation methodologies prevents courts from distinguishing
between value-enhancing and value-reducing allocations of control rights.
The Delaware case that best reﬂects the approach outlined in this section is eBay. In eBay, the Delaware Chancery Court declined to review a
corporate governance decision that clearly beneﬁted the controllers—the
implementation of a staggered board that effectively denied board representation to the minority shareholder—under the entire fairness standard.207 This case ﬁts an approach focused on charter interpretation not
204. See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL
729232, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (describing a case in which the “deal was conditioned
on a majority of the publicly held Class A shares being voted in favor, and a successful vote
to amend the [company] Charter to allow [the controller] to receive the differential”).
205. See Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical
Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 852, 913 & n.156 (noting that Blue Apron, Inc. authorized the issuance of future nonvoting shares in the IPO
charter).
206. As the optimal allocation of the power to relocate control rights is company speciﬁc, courts may be asked by minority shareholders to read implied limitations on the controller’s power into speciﬁc charter provisions at speciﬁc companies.
207. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 37 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“I am not
persuaded that entire fairness review applies to the Staggered Board Amendments . . . .”); see
also supra section I.B.1.
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only because it applied the business judgment rule to a midstream reallocation of control rights, but also because the court emphasized that applying the entire fairness standard would contradict the parties’ initial decision to provide the controllers with the right to unilaterally implement this
change:
The right to amend the [C]raigslist charter, however, without
eBay’s consent if eBay chose to compete with [C]raigslist was a
beneﬁt Jim and Craig negotiated for and secured in the
Shareholders’ Agreement. Section 8.3 [of the Shareholders’
Agreement] plainly articulates that beneﬁt. Thus, the Staggered
Board Amendments cannot be inequitable because they were
exactly the sort of consequence eBay accepted would occur if
eBay decided to compete with [C]raigslist.208
As such, the court plainly stated that the plaintiffs were “seek[ing] to obtain a beneﬁt [they were] not able to obtain” in negotiations for the
“Shareholders’ Agreement.”209
Moreover, this Article’s approach is also consistent with Williams v.
Geier, in which the Delaware Supreme Court granted business judgment
review to a controlled public company that adopted a charter amendment
creating “tenure shares” resulting in an effect similar to that achieved
through a dual-class structure.210 The Williams plaintiffs argued that “the
action of the Board in recommending the Amendment and
Recapitalization to the stockholders constituted either a breach of ﬁduciary duty or an impermissible effort at entrenchment, both of which are
claimed to rebut the business judgment presumption and implicate entire
fairness review.”211 The court squarely rejected this contention, even while
acknowledging the possibility that the majority shareholders would beneﬁt
more from the recapitalization than the minority shareholders.212 As
explained above, similar rulings were given in the other cases detailed in
section I.B.1. Yet, all of these cases reach results similar to the approach
recommended in this Article—deferring to the allocation of control rights
outlined in the corporate charter—without explicitly adopting this
Article’s reasoning.213 Expressly explaining that this outcome is the result
208. eBay, 16 A.3d at 39.
209. Id.
210. See supra section I.B.1.
211. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1378 (Del. 1996).
212. Id. at 1385.
213. Although these cases reached a conclusion that conforms with this Article’s recommendation, they continue to subject the outcome to judicial discretion by relying on the
business judgment rule. See supra section I.B.1. This is problematic because the business
judgment rule reverts to entire fairness if one of the conditions for its application fails. See
Williams, 671 A.2d at 1384. Thus, granting companies business judgment review in reallocations of control rights only works if the companies “get it right”; if they fail, then the court
will again be forced to evaluate the recapitalization under the fairness standard. This
Article’s approach calls on Delaware to address the question as one of charter interpretation
rather than one of judicial review.
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of the controller’s right to reallocate control rights will importantly
provide the market with better guidance.
Lastly, the analysis here also applies to the CBS dispute. This Article
contends that if the dispute had not settled, the court should have focused
on the parties’ ex ante arrangements about the allocation of power concerning midstream reallocation of control rights. As the default rule in
controlled companies is that the controller’s control is protected by a
property rule,214 the only way to justify the board’s discretion to take control rights from the controller is to ﬁnd that the controller had agreed ex
ante to grant the board such a power. The extent to which this was the case
was disputed in the CBS litigation.215 But, if the controller had indeed so
agreed, the business judgment rule should apply to the board’s decision
to dilute the controller, without any further review of the board’s
discretion.
The proposal to defer to the parties’ choice is driven by the need to
respect the rights of sophisticated parties to adopt the corporate arrangement that is most tailored to their needs. In the control rights context, this
need is reinforced by the recognition that no arrangement is generally
superior. Rather, the parties must choose between two imperfect alternatives. Moreover, a clear statement from courts indicating that they will
defer to the parties’ initial choice—rather than attempt to assess ex post
the fairness of the reallocation of control rights—will signal to parties the
need to choose at the outset the arrangements that will govern midstream
reallocation of control rights. In the case of public companies with a dualclass structure, for example, investors could insist on expanding the scope
of class voting rights.
In the past, corporate law scholars were skeptical about the claim that
governance arrangements adopted at the IPO stage are optimal.216 In
recent decades, however, there has been a dramatic rise in the power of
institutional investors, which now own most of the shares of publicly traded
corporations in the United States.217 These sophisticated investors are able

214. Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 601.
215. The CBS plaintiffs argued that “the fact that the certiﬁcate of incorporation of CBS
(and Viacom), unlike those of some other controlled companies, authorizes the Board to
approve a stock dividend that would dilute NAI’s voting power is itself evidence of CBS’s
commitment to independent board governance.” CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No.
2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018). The defendants disagreed.
Id. The court stated that it was “express[ing] no opinion” on this interpretation. Id.
216. See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm
Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83, 110–13 (2001) (attempting
to develop conclusions as to why inefficient antitakeover provisions are included in IPOstage charters).
217. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 263, 304–07 (2019) (describing the growth of pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies as shareholders of publicly traded corporations).
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to negotiate governance terms and prices with any ﬁrm wishing to go public.218 Furthermore, at least for companies with a dual-class share structure,
the IPO market for governance terms seems to be quite an active one. To
begin, although many founders would clearly like to go public with a dualclass structure, only a minority of ﬁrms succeed.219 Additionally, dual-class
companies that go public exhibit a considerable variety of governance
arrangements in their charters, providing different provisions regarding
the allocation of power between controllers and minority shareholders.220
This variety suggests that founders cannot simply dictate governance terms
and that some form of bargaining between founders and investors does
take place at the IPO stage. Thus, whatever charter arrangements the parties have made as to midstream reallocation of control rights should be
respected.
2. A Default Rule. — The approach explained in section III.B.1 would
require Delaware courts to identify the parties’ choice concerning the
power to reallocate control rights. Delaware courts often address disputes
over charter interpretation,221 and the rules that guide courts when they
interpret corporate charters will not be revisited here. However, how
should courts decide cases in which the process of charter interpretation
provides no answer on the parties’ agreement on the issue of control
rights? And what should be the default rule?
There is substantial literature about what types of default rules are
optimal;222 this literature will not be reviewed here. Instead, this section
focuses on the inherent tradeoff implicating the choice of a default rule
for midstream reallocations of control rights. As explained above, the two
possible rules are imperfect. The rule allowing the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights will increase both the expected beneﬁt from
idiosyncratic vision and the expected loss from agency costs. The rule
218. See id.
219. See Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Dual-Class IPO Snapshot: 2017–2018 Statistics,
https://www.cii.org/files/2018Y%20IPO%20Stats%20for%20Website.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YXT9-3V7P] (last updated Jan. 2, 2019) (showing that in 2017, only nineteen percent of
IPOs had dual-class structures).
220. Winden, supra note 205, at 860 (conducting an empirical study of the charter provisions of dual-class companies).
221. See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL
729232, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (holding that the controller lacked the power to propose a charter amendment that would entitle it to a control premium).
222. For literature on default rules in contracts, see generally David Charny,
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L.
Rev. 1815 (1991); Symposium, Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. Cal.
Interdisciplinary L.J. 1 (1993). For default rules in corporate law, see Michael Klausner,
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 826–34 (1995)
(examining how to design corporate defaults in light of network externalities); Ian Ayres,
Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1391, 1397–400 (1992) (reviewing Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991)) (discussing how to design corporate law
defaults in light of information-forcing considerations).
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providing the minority with a veto right will decrease both the expected
beneﬁt from idiosyncratic vision and the expected loss from agency costs.
The expected value of each rule is the sum of both effects. Accordingly, if
the expected beneﬁts from idiosyncratic vision are higher than the
expected loss from agency costs, the default rule should allow the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights, and vice versa.223
For many years Delaware law had a single uniform default:224 Shareholders holding a majority of the votes can unilaterally amend the corporate charter.225 Indeed, in a long line of cases, described in section I.B.1
and illustrated most prominently by Williams v. Geier,226 Delaware concluded that the controller has the authority to unilaterally reallocate
control rights and accordingly applied the business judgment rule. Unfortunately, this simple default lost its certainty during Google’s 2012
settlement hearing227 and culminated in the application of the entire fairness test in Crane.228 This development might have altered Delaware’s de
facto default rule. While the application of the business judgment rule in
earlier cases granted the controller the power to unilaterally reallocate
control rights, the application of the entire fairness standard in the recent
cases has practically granted the minority shareholders a veto right over
reallocation of control rights.
223. The analysis in the text discusses in the abstract the beneﬁt from idiosyncratic
vision and the loss from agency costs. A fuller account would also consider the likelihood
that, given the difficulties that were identiﬁed above, minority shareholders would fail to
approve value-enhancing reallocation of control rights.
224. The optimal default does not necessarily have to be identical across all types of
control rights and all governance structures. For example, one default rule might apply to
dual-class companies and another to companies with one-share-one-vote. This view might
be reinforced by then-Chancellor Leo Strine’s comments at the Google settlement. See
Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *38, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder
Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“[F]rom the beginning, everyone has been clear with the people who lined up in hoards . . . to buy Google
stock, with the understanding that these founders were going public but with no . . . intention to relinquish voting control . . . and that when you invested in Google, that was sort of
your understanding.”). Indeed, the stock exchange rules prohibit midstream changes from
single- to dual-class shares. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 Va. L. Rev. 585, 597 & n.35 (2017).
225. In dual-class companies, this default rule is supplemented by the Delaware default
on the conditions under which a charter amendment requires a speciﬁc shareholder class
vote. See Del. Code tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2019). Under Delaware law, in companies with more
than one class of shares, a charter amendment would have to be approved by a class of shares
if it would change “the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so
as to affect them adversely.” Id. For an analysis of the differences between the Delaware
approach and that of the Model Business Corporations Law, see Michael P. Dooley &
Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act and
the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 Bus. Law. 737, 750–52 (2001).
226. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text.
227. See Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *37, In re Google Inc. Class C
S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 2013 WL 6735045.
228. See supra note 15.
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The earlier Delaware cases applying the business judgment rule preferred the protection of idiosyncratic vision over the risk of agency costs.
There is no evidence to justify changing this long-standing preference,
especially for companies with a dual-class share structure. While the risk of
agency costs is omnipresent, so is the promise of idiosyncratic vision. For
instance, a 2018 study found that only a handful of the publicly traded
ﬁrms are responsible for most of the return in the stock market. Speciﬁcally, “the best-performing 4% of listed companies explain the net gain for
the entire US stock market since 1926, as other stocks collectively matched
Treasury bills.”229 Given the wide variety of industries,230 and the large
ninety-year window used, this study attests to the potential value of idiosyncratic vision. After all, it is the idiosyncratic vision of entrepreneurs that
allows their companies to produce returns that signiﬁcantly outperform
the market. Even if only some of the ﬁrms in that four percent group had
managers with idiosyncratic vision, the market-wide costs from losing that
vision would be substantial, thereby supporting a default rule that allows
controllers to unilaterally reallocate control rights.
Moreover, especially for dual-class companies, changing market realities provide another reason to question the change in the default rule suggested by the recent Delaware cases. In the past, institutional investors
were less powerful, more shares were held by retail investors, and few
activist attacks or hostile takeovers took place. Thus, powerful CEOs practically enjoyed uncontestable control that allowed them to pursue their
idiosyncratic vision without fear of removal by investors. Consequently, the
unilateral power to reallocate control rights was less crucial to preserve
idiosyncratic vision. Today, with the increasing dominance of institutional
investors’ ownership and the rise of hedge fund activism, managers need
formal control to pursue their idiosyncratic vision even when investors
think that they are wrong,231 and the most effective tool to accomplish that
end is a dual-class structure. In fact, in the recent decade the demand by
entrepreneurs for, and the use of, dual-class structures has increased, suggesting that, in today’s market environment, having legal incontestable
control is increasingly perceived as essential for managers wishing to attain
idiosyncratic vision.232 The recent Delaware cases proposing a change of
229. Hendrik Bessembinder, Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?, 129 J. Fin. Econ.
440, 440 (2018).
230. See id. at 454 tbl.5 for a summary of the ﬁfty ﬁrms with the greatest creation of
wealth for their shareholders.
231. See Goshen & Hannes, supra note 217, at 304–08 (arguing that the rise of institutional investors and increased shareholder sophistication has lowered barriers to shareholder action and increased shareholder inﬂuence).
232. See Bradford D. Jordan, Soohyung Kim & Mark H. Liu, Growth Opportunities,
Short-Term Market Pressure, and Dual-Class Share Structure, 41 J. Corp. Fin. 304, 305
(2016) (ﬁnding that “dual-class shares . . . can help managers focus on the implementation
of long-term projects while avoiding short-term market pressure”). Unfortunately, the inevitable tension between agency costs and idiosyncratic vision cannot be resolved by the existing empirical studies on dual-class ﬁrms. Since these companies provide controllers with
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the default rule go against the market reality in which it is more crucial to
protect idiosyncratic vision by keeping the old default allowing unilateral
reallocation of control rights.
The optimal default rule regarding reallocation of control rights
depends on the relative expected beneﬁts of idiosyncratic vision compared
to the expected losses from agency costs. Past Delaware cases adopted a
default rule that favored idiosyncratic vision over agency costs. Given the
current market realities, there is no compelling reason to change that
default.
CONCLUSION
This point cannot be overstated: Without an objective valuation,
entire fairness review collapses, as there is no way to determine the appropriate payment to impose upon a controlling shareholder for engaging in
the proposed action. In the context of cash-ﬂow disputes, objective valuation has proven to be a fairly surmountable challenge. Cash ﬂows are,
intrinsically, readily capable of being assigned an objective fair value. Relying on techniques developed by ﬁnancial economists—most commonly a
DCF analysis—Delaware judges faced with cash-ﬂow disputes engage in
fairly complex valuation analyses to determine the fair value of a challenged transaction. Indeed, this practice has been codiﬁed into Delaware’s
corporate code.233 In so doing, the Delaware courts have become
renowned for their acumen in deploying the entire fairness standard bolstered by competent valuations.
However, similar valuation techniques cannot be devised for control
rights. These rights are simply too ﬁrm speciﬁc and individual speciﬁc to
permit a reliable, objective valuation. Thus, in assessing the reallocation of
control rights, courts are unable to use the legal tools that they have successfully employed to resolve cash-ﬂow conﬂicts. The entire fairness standard and Delaware’s voluntary MFW conditions both necessitate valuation
models to operate. Similarly, if history is a guide, intermediate standards
of review will also fail to provide any meaningful regulation and ultimately
will devolve into business judgment review. As a result, Delaware is left with
only one choice: to enforce the allocation of control rights for which parties have bargained in the charter and to establish a default rule for cases
in which the charter is silent on the issue of reallocation. This approach

incontestable control, their relative performance or market valuation could indicate
whether the beneﬁts of securing founders’ ability to pursue their idiosyncratic visions
exceed the loss from agency costs. However, empirical studies on the relative performance
of dual-class ﬁrms have reached conﬂicting results.
233. Under Delaware law, “In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into
account all relevant factors.” Del. Code tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019). Although section 262 as written governs appraisal rights, the Supreme Court of Delaware has held that this principle
likewise governs cash-out mergers. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
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not only provides a sensible resolution to control rights conﬂicts, but also
comports with a long line of Delaware jurisprudence.

